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ABSTRACT 
This thesis introduces the theory of domestic realism 
to explain and predict state behavior under threat. The 
formulation of the theory relies on a dual track approach. 
The first is eclectic and deductive; this track utilizes 
concepts from diverse fields, especially from International 
Relations theory, to build the theory. The second track is 
inductive and illustrates the theory by introducing four 
case studies.  
Domestic realism holds that the behavior of states, its 
institutions and its citizens responsible for security, 
under perceived high threats is marked by aberrations that 
starkly depart from their espoused norms, laws, and values. 
The prime concern for security and self-preservation trumps 
all other legal constraints and ethical considerations. 
In spite of its tragic and unsettling nature, it 
behooves us to accept the domestic realism notion that 
aberrations in behavior are inevitable in the face of 
looming threats. Only through increased awareness can we 
inoculate and educate leaders at different levels to account 
for the manifestations of domestic realism as they formulate 
and implement policies, and to prompt them to be proactive 
and to incorporate mechanisms for oversight and 
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I. THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM 
…It went on and on into the night. Women carried 
the wounded and broken bodies from the road until 
they dropped from exhaustion. But still it went 
on and on. Whatever moral ascendancy the West 
held was lost here today. India is free for she 
has taken all that steel and cruelty can give, 
and she has neither cringed nor retreated. 
The above words are taken from the famous scene in the 
movie Gandhi during which the American journalist Vince 
Walker of the New York Times, in the role played by actor 
Martin Sheen, reported the beating of Indian men by guards 
at the Dharasana Salt Works on May 21, 1930.1 India at that 
time was still under British rule; and there was a ban on 
the making of salt without license from the British 
authorities which Gandhi set out to change in the famous 
Salt March. Gandhi and his followers employed civil 
disobedience and nonviolent resistance to achieve their goal 
of an independent India. They started by challenging the 
laws that governed the making of salt; the Salt March and 
the attempt to gain access to the Dharasana Salt Works were 
carried out in that context. As Walker reported, the attempt 
to access the Works was met by a harsh response from the 
guards at the site under the British command; clubs were 
used by the guards on the approaching unarmed nonviolent  
 
 
                     
1 The quote is taken from scene number 19, “Dharasana Salt Works,” 
Gandhi, DVD, directed by Richard Attenborough (1982; Columbia Tristar 
Home Entertainment, 2001); a version of the original screenplay written 
by John Briley, Gandhi: The Screenplay is available at 
http://www.hundland.com/scripts/Gandhi.htm (accessed January 13, 2007). 
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columns of Indian men and hundreds of them suffered 
injuries, including cracked skulls, bleeding, and 
unconsciousness.2 
One can reason that Walker was probably driven by the 
American idealism of the 1930s for him to see the government 
action against the Indians as a loss of moral ascendancy for 
the West at large; nonetheless, the question of why various 
states in different parts of the world descend down some 
path and resort to such actions and under what conditions 
remains a valid one across time.  
    
A. PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING DOMESTIC REALISM 
This thesis addresses the question of why states 
sometimes depart from their espoused laws, ideals, and 
values and infringe upon the rights of their subjects, 
whether within their own borders or in other areas under 
their control. It seeks to reach an answer through 
generalization that is based on existing empirical evidence 
by introducing a theory that the author calls Domestic 
Realism. The theory argues that the driving force behind 
such behavior is the presence of a high level of threat that 
could affect one or more of three levels of analysis that 
feed into each other: the individual, the institutional or 
bureaucratic, and the state levels.    
                     
2 Another account of the event is provided by Matthew Taylor, “The 
Pinch Heard ‘Round the World: Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha 75 Years On,” 
PeacePower; Berkeley’s Journal of Principled Nonviolence and Conflict 
Transformation 1, no. 1 (2005), 
http://www.calpeacepower.org/0101/salt_march.htm (accessed January 13, 
2007).  
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Domestic realism seeks to explain and predict such 
events that exhibit a stark departure from expected liberal 
democratic norms and ideals by establishing a causal 
relationship between threats and modes of behavior at the 
three aforementioned levels of analysis. The theory of 
domestic realism seeks to formulate overarching hypotheses 
that obviate the need to rediscover history and to 
repeatedly ask the question of “Why did it happen?” whenever 
we are confronted with similar events. In other words, it 
moves from the isolated events to the recurring pattern, 
from seeing the trees to seeing the forest. Most 
importantly, by introducing this new paradigm and addressing 
these policy relevant questions, it attempts to foster a 
greater understanding of these events and their causes in 
the hope of mitigating their effects. 
 
B. ORIGINS AND MOTIVATION 
Domestic realism is motivated by the belief in the 
equality of human beings. This belief is preached by 
religions, and taught by liberal political thought. It is 
often reaffirmed during historical events as can be seen in 
the slogan of the French Revolution (liberty, equality, 
fraternity); it eloquently appears in the preamble of the 
United States Declaration of Independence (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”). 
Domestic realism interprets this equality in the broadest of 
terms to mean equality of rights as well as equality in 
makeup, psyche, behavior, and response to stimuli and 
events.  
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Domestic realism draws upon events and concepts from 
history, psychology, philosophy, ethics, comparative 
politics, and upon the realist tradition in International 
Relations (IR) Theory, to explain domestic policies under 
threat. The theory starts with basic assumptions that cross 
with those made by realists about the importance of security 
in society, how power is desired and sought, the rationality 
of the actors, the utility of alliances, and about the 
imperative of success especially in a democratic setting 
that punishes failures at the ballot box. 
Even though usually we start with local phenomena and 
extrapolate to the international realm, domestic realism 
does the opposite by taking concepts from the well developed 
field of International Relations and “intrapolating” 
deductively to gain insight into states’ domestic policies. 
Domestic realism makes use of the equality and similarity 
aspects of all human beings. Therefore, the theory expects 
similar reactions from different people across time and 
culture to the same incidents - especially threatening ones 
once they reach a certain tipping point, the threshold level 
of which might differ among actors and cultures. Domestic 
realism calls this cross-border cross-cultural uniformity, 
the uniformity of the human response. 
 
C. IMPORTANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC NEXUS 
Even though domestic realism focuses on internal 
policies of states, it has international implications. The 
nature of a country’s domestic policies and its regard for 
its own citizens or subjects is of course important in its 
own right, but it may also influence the way that country is 
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perceived by the international community. The country’s 
international image, reputation, and prestige are 
significantly affected by its domestic policies.3 How it 
acts internally, has a bearing on relations with other 
countries, up to the point of diplomatic recognition. 
Oppressive policies have been used by democratic countries 
that uphold certain standards as grounds for passive 
criticism or even for active intervention either through 
sanctions or through military intervention. Examples 
include: the former Soviet Union, China, Kosovo, and Iraq. 
 
D. EXISTING LITERATURE   
Examination of the literature reveals the absence of 
any theory to explain events that depart from expected modes 
of behavior; the trend is usually to look at incidents as 
isolated events, and in denial, to see the perpetrators as 
“a few bad apples,” to search for causes anew each time, and 
to generally ignore what domestic realism sees as the 
inevitable recurring pattern of behavior when confronted 
with mounting threats. 
Several references document policies and abuses of 
power from a historical perspective, and some attempt to 
draw analogies between previous practices and our current 
counter terrorism policies, but they fail to construct a 
theoretical generalization of reactions to threats over 
                     
3 Morgenthau discusses the importance of image, reputation, and 
prestige for states. He states that a policy of prestige is “an 
intrinsic element” of international relations and that prestige 
contributes to security, wealth, and power. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Knopf, 1954), 67-79.  
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time.4 Some focus on terrorism and address state response in 
the past in various democratic countries; again the coverage 
is historical in nature.5 Other references focus on 
existential threat to a state such as war and on the use of 
constitutionally approved emergency powers or legislations 
in time of crisis and the balance between these powers and 
liberties; at times use is made of extra-constitutional 
measures.6 
International Relations realist literature provides 
background on security and about the different variants of 
realism and on alliances and alignments in the face of 
                     
4 David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional 
Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (New York: The New Press, 2003); 
Cynthia Brown, ed., Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal 
Freedom (New York: The New Press, 2003); Edward Pessen, Losing Our 
Souls: The American Experience in the Cold War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
1995); Athan G. Theoharis, The FBI & American Democracy: A Brief 
Critical History (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004); David 
Wise, The American Police State: The Government Against the People (New 
York: Random House, 1976). 
5 Andrew Silke, ed., Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological 
Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (England: Wiley, 2003); 
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2nd ed. (New York: New 
York University Press, 1986); Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus 
Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Alex 
Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993); David A. Charters, ed., The Deadly Sin of 
Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Charles H. Brower II, Nigel 
Rodley, and Oren Gross, “Torture, Violence, and the Global War on 
Terror,” (American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting, 2005). 
6 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in 
the Modern Democracies (New York: Harbinger, 1963); Michael Freeman, 
Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency 
Powers to Fight Terror (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); David Cole and 
James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil 
Liberties in the Name of National Security (New York: The New Press, 
2002); Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception 
in Spanish America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1993); Daniel Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of 
Prerogative Powers in the United States (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses 
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?” The Yale Law Journal 112, 
no. 5 (March 2003): 1011. 
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external and internal threats.7 Furthermore, other 
literature makes the case for bringing human nature back 
into politics.8 
Literature on political violence provides insight into 
state behavior in various countries as governments go about 
policing violence; some cases exhibit little restraint in 
accomplishing that.9 
The fields of psychology and sociology provide insight 
into the nature of threat and into responses to threat; 
International Relations theory addresses perceptions and 
misperceptions that can be useful in assessing threat.10 
                     
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1954); John H. Herz, Political 
Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2001); Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of 
World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3-43; 
Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43, 
no. 2 (January 1991): 233-256. 
8 James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of 
Political Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1963); J. Roland Pennock and John 
W. Chapman, eds., Human Nature in Politics (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997); Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern 
Denial of Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 2002). 
9 Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and 
the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Christopher Hewitt, Consequences of 
Political Violence (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1993); Ted Honderich, 
Political Violence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976); Peter 
Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Poweful: A Century of Nonviolent 
Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
10 Thomas W. Milburn and Kenneth H. Watman, On the Nature of Threat: 
A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1981); George A. 
Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Political Sociology: Readings in 
Research and Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1980); Philip E. 
Tetlock, “Social Psychology and World Politics,” in The Handbook of 
Social Psychology, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 868-912; 
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Benjamin Fordham, 
“The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political 
Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994,” International Studies 
Quarterly 42, no. 3(September 1998): 567-590. 
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Various articles address the relationship between threat and 
repression and its use by democratic as well as non-
democratic states.11  
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will rely on a dual track approach in 
making the case for domestic realism. The first track is 
deductive and is based on utilizing concepts of 
International Relations theory and adapting them to domestic 
behavior; this is in line with the eclectic theory-building 
approach of “importing existing theories from one domain and 
adapting them to explain phenomena in another.”12       
The second track will be one of induction moving from 
observations and cases to theory generalization; it will 
rely on historical interpretation of events that feed into 
each other at the three levels of analysis (individual, 
institutional, and state). Different case studies taken from 
well-established democracies will be analyzed in their 
historical context in order to establish the causal 
relationship between the independent variable being threat, 
                     
11 Robert W. White and Terry Falkenberg White, “Repression and the 
Liberal State: The Case of Northern Ireland, 1969-1972,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 330-352; Christian Davenport, 
“Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry 
into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions,” American Journal of Political 
Science 39, no. 3 (August 1995): 683-713; Scott Sigmund Gartner and 
Patrick M. Regan, “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship 
between Government and Opposition Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 
33, no. 3 (August 1996): 273-287; Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and 
Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” Sociological Theory 21, 
no. 1 (March 2003): 44-68. 
12 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political 
Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27; the author 
mentions in the footnote that this technique was originally suggested by 
Shively, Craft of Political Research, 165. 
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and the dependent variable being behavior that departs from 
liberal democratic norms. In certain cases there will be an 
intervening variable through the corollary of supremacy of 
righteousness which will be explained later.  
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter will introduce the Theory of Domestic 
Realism and its various aspects. Subsequent chapters will 
discuss case studies reflecting the manifestation of 
domestic realism at each of the three levels of analysis. 
One or two cases will be analyzed for each of the three 
levels of analysis. At the individual level, the Stanford 
Prison Experiment of 1971 and the shootings at Kent State 
University of 1970 will be analyzed. The prison experiment 
gives a research-based example of average students becoming 
abusive while playing the role of guards in a simulated 
prison setting; and the Kent State shootings demonstrate how 
guardsmen resorted to use of force as they felt threatened 
by student protesters. At the institutional level, 
experimentation on humans will be analyzed; this will 
primarily be about U.S. experiments during the Cold War 
following the dawn of the nuclear age. At the state level, 
the French involvement in Algeria during the period of 1954-
1962 will be analyzed; faced with the threat of losing 
control of Algeria, severely harsh measures were employed to 
stop Algerian nationalists. A conclusion will summarize the 
findings. 
 10
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II. THE THEORY OF DOMESTIC REALISM 
The essence of ultimate decision remains 
impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to 
the decider himself. … There will always be the 
dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making 
process—mysterious even to those who may be most 
intimately involved. 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy13  
 
The above quote by the late President Kennedy captures 
the important insight that decisions and actions are not 
fully understood even by those who make them. This is why 
experiments in psychology are conducted under controlled 
conditions; and in the absence of such experiments, theories 
are formulated to help make sense of the outside world and 
to explain and predict when certain actions are carried out 
and how individuals and collectivities react to certain 
stimuli to produce those decisions and actions. Introducing 
domestic realism is one such attempt to explain aberrations 
in domestic policies that part company with espoused ideals 
of most states. 
Since the methodological approach adopted here relies 
on adapting IR concepts, especially realist principles, a 
short summary of such concepts is presented next. However, 
it is worth noting at the outset that no attempt will be 
made to contrast realism with other IR theories for two 
reasons. First, it is simply well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Second, there has been a continuing debate among the 
                     
13 Quoted in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 
1999), i. 
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different schools of thought in International Relations 
theory that will likely continue well into the future with 
proponents of each theory advancing their hypotheses and 
criticizing those of others, thus making it impractical to 
make such an attempt. Moreover, it is quite reasonable to 
expect that all theories will continue to exist in the 
future.   
 
A. REALISM AND ITS VARIANTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY  
Realism is the longest existing paradigm among the IR 
theories. It is said to have started with the writings of 
Sun Tzu in China, and Thucydides in Greece more than two 
thousand years ago. It was followed a few hundred years ago 
by the writings of Machiavelli in Italy, Hobbes in England, 
and Rousseau in France.14 It was never superseded by other 
theories; in fact it “has been the dominant theory of world 
politics since the beginning of academic International 
Relations,” especially after the end of the Second World 
War.15 
There are several variants of realism. The primary ones 
are classical or human nature (anthropological) realism, 
structural neorealism or defensive realism, and offensive 
realism.  
                     
14 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 
7th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006), 55-56; Tim Dunne and Brian C. 
Schmidt, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations, 3rd ed. Edited by John Baylis 
and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162.  
15 Dunne and Schmidt, 162, 165.  
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Classical realism, which emerged under the impact of 
two World Wars, Nazism and the rise of bipolarity and 
strongly rejected the Wilsonian idealism of the interwar 
period,  holds a pessimistic view regarding human nature and 
its supposed effect on relations among states. According to 
the older writings of Hobbes, actors are pursuing their own 
self-interests thus leading to a perpetual “state of war” 
and to what he called in his “Leviathan” the “homo homini 
lupus” principle. Human nature is seen as selfish rather 
than altruistic.16 In the post Second World War years, the 
writings of Morgenthau emphasized the perennial quest for 
power defined as the “control of man over man”; his realist 
work on human nature, inspired by Reinhold Niebuhr (“animus 
dominandi”), became popular for decades thereafter.17 
Alongside other variants of realism, states are considered 
the primary actors and they are continually vying to 
increase their power; according to classical realists, the 
“lust for power is inherent in states.”18 Power here can be 
defined as having greater resources militarily, 
economically, and demographically; whereby these resources 
can be leveraged to influence other actors.19 
Defensive or structural neorealism, which was 
introduced by Waltz20, contends that the competition among 
                     
16 Goldstein and Pevehouse, 55-57. 
17 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1954); Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man 
and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1932). 
18 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 19-22. 
19 Dunne and Schmidt, 180. 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
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states is determined by the structure of the international 
system which is characterized by anarchy or the absence of a 
central authority. Therefore, there is no entity to enforce 
laws and states have to take care of themselves in this 
self-help system. The struggle for power is primarily 
motivated by the need for security and by the will to 
survive. According to defensive realism, the “principal 
interest” is security and the “pre-eminent goal” is 
survival.21 States are mainly concerned with relative, not 
with absolute gains, which makes cooperation very unlikely. 
One inevitable consequence is Herz’s notion of the security 
dilemma, namely, that the enhanced security of one state and 
“the means by which a state tries to increase its security 
decrease the security of others.”22 In order to increase the 
collective power of states they sometimes engage in power-
balancing through the formation of alliances that help those 
states by leveraging their pooled resources to counter 
common threats whether they are actual or perceived.23 
Offensive realism is also driven by the structure of 
the system. According to its main protagonist, John 
Mearsheimer, all states are power maximizers which seek to 
dominate the system. They are not, as defensive realists 
assert, status quo oriented and satisfied with the power 
distribution (“satisficers”). Once they have achieved 
                     
21 Dunne and Schmidt, 174. 
22 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in 
Theories and Realities (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); 
Miles Kahler, “Inventing International Relations: International 
Relations Theory After 1945,” in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 
eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1997), 28; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma,” World Politics vol. XXX, no. 2 (January 1978): 169. 
23 Goldstein and Pevehouse, 76, 84. 
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hegemony, they “seek to prevent the rise of ‘peer 
competitors’” to ensure their continued hegemony.24 In his 
book about great power politics, Mearsheimer further argues 
that “[a]lthough it is depressing to realize that great 
powers might think and act this way, it behooves us to see 
the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.”25  
One of the basic tenets of realism is the 
conceptualization of states as the primary actors in 
international politics. Another basic tenet is that state 
behavior is not governed by their domestic political 
systems, culture, or morality; the following quote 
succinctly summarizes this belief: 
…realists believe that the behavior of great 
powers is influenced mainly by their external 
environment, not by their internal 
characteristics. The structure of the 
international system, which all states must deal 
with, largely shapes their foreign policies. 
Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states, because all 
great powers act according to the same logic 
regardless of their culture, political system, or 
who runs the government. It is therefore 
difficult to discriminate among states, save for 
differences in relative power. In essence, great 
powers are like billiard balls that vary only in 
size.26 
 
                     
24 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World: Offensive Realism and the 
Struggle for Security,” International Security 27 (Summer 2002), a 
Review of John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. 
W. Norton, 2001). 
25 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 3-4. 
26 Mearsheimer, 17-18. 
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Realism historically adopted an “ethic of 
responsibility” which limits the role of ethics in 
international relations and considers that desired outcomes 
may be achieved through amoral actions.27 To expound on this 
concept further, and to stress the similarity across states 
in the realist tradition, it is crucial to emphasize that:  
Realists tend to treat political power as 
separate from, and predominant over, morality, 
ideology, and other social and economic aspects 
of life. For realists, ideologies do not matter 
much, nor do religions or other cultural factors 
with which states may explain their actions. 
Realists see states with very different religions 
or ideologies or economic systems as quite 
similar in their actions with regard to national 
power.28 
The other major assumption shared by realists, besides 
the role of the “generic” state and the anarchic nature of 
the international system, is the rational actor assumption 
whereby states act as “rational individuals” and as utility 
maximizers in pursuing their interests according to a cost-
benefit calculus akin to rational choice.29  
Realism stood the test of time and provided valuable 
insight into state actions. There are of course other 
competing theories of IR; however, as was stated earlier, it 
is not within the purview of this thesis to address the 
debate between the different schools of thought in IR. In 
this thesis we utilize the realist principles outlined above 
and apply them domestically. Before doing so, there is a 
need to introduce some other concepts. 
                     
27 Dunne and Schmidt, 180. 
28 Goldstein and Pevehouse, 56. 
29 Ibid., 56-57. 
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B. THE BASIC PROPOSITION OF DOMESTIC REALISM 
It is useful at this stage to introduce the basic 
proposition of domestic realism without much elaboration as 
it will be revisited later after discussing other pertinent 
background. The basic proposition of domestic realism is 
that under perceived high threats, states, their 
institutions,  and their citizens that are responsible for 
security within the state, act similarly across cultures and 
across political systems, and that the nature of their 
domestic behavior invariably entails encroachments on civil 
liberties and human rights and a departure from laws, 
ideals, values, and moral standards they might hold dear at 
other times.  
The line of thought to be followed will be based on the 
fact that threats reduce security and the prospects for 
survival, be it physical or political; such situations 
necessitate actions that eventually lead to abuse as the 
push for survival overtakes morals under mounting threats. 
The theory of realism provides the basis for similarity 
between states and for the subjugation of morality. 
C. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
International Relations theory, including realism, 
makes use of different levels of analysis to simplify the 
study of complex settings.30 Unlike realism, which is 
                     
30 Goldstein and Pevehouse, 15-17; J. David Singer, “The Level-of-
Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in Klaus Knorr and Sidney 
Verba, The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961); Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 13-31; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de 
Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 5-7. 
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primarily concerned with state level actors, domestic 
realism as a theory of state behavior under threat 
incorporates three levels of analysis: the individual level, 
the institutional or bureaucratic level, and the state 
level.  
One or more of the three levels might feel affected by 
a threat and adopt a policy or initiate a response to that 
threat; the effects of that response, however, sometimes 
feed into other levels because they either precipitate a 
wider crisis when the initial response is initiated by the 
lower sub-state levels, or because the measures to implement 
a state policy have to be carried out by actors at the lower 
institutional or individual levels.   
The fact that actions taken by an actor on one level 
could spread or feed into the other levels can be seen in 
the LA riots of 1991. What started as the beating of Rodney 
King by individual members of the Los Angeles Police 
Department led to the LA riots and the decision of Governor 
Pete Wilson to send in the California National Guard; and it 
later led to intervention by President Bush to federalize 
the National Guard and to retry the responsible officers in 
a federal court (for different charges because of the so 




                     
31 Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots 
Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 20-50, 
325, 343, 373-377. 
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The prison abuses at Abu Ghraib that were carried out 
by prison guards harmed the image of both the military 
establishment and that of the United States and in all 
likelihood contributed to increased insurgency acts against 
U.S. troops.  
In the particular case where there exists a high level 
of abuse as a consequence of state policy, the three levels 
become actively interacting. Strict policies of the state 
that are harshly enforced by security agencies increase 
public discontent and increase resistance to those policies, 
thereby necessitating even stricter measures by the state 
and its agents. Domestic realism calls this cyclical process 
the “Vicious Circle of Blatant Measures,” which becomes 
increasingly difficult to break. The insight that people 
adhere to behavior that is suppressed is supported by the 
psychological work of J. W. Brehm: “when a free behavior is 
threatened with elimination, the individual’s desire for 
that behavior or its object will increase;” and “when a free 
behavior is threatened with elimination, the individual will 
tend to attempt re-establishment of freedom by engaging in 
the behavior which is threatened.”32  
The recently released U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency field manual alludes to the same mechanism 
in discussing “Reaction to Abuses:” 
Though firmness by security forces is often 
necessary to establish a secure environment, a 
government that exceeds accepted local norms and 
abuses its people or is tyrannical generates 
resistance to its rule. People who have been 
                     
32 Quoted in Thomas W. Milburn and Kenneth H. Watman, On The Nature 
of Threat: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1981), 
37-38. 
 20
maltreated or have had close friends or relatives 
killed by the government, particularly by its 
security forces, may strike back at their 
attackers. Security force abuses and the social 
upheaval caused by collateral damage from combat 
can be major escalating factors for 
insurgencies.33  
 
D. SCOPE AND SPECTRUM 
Two points are worth mentioning about the scope of 
domestic realism, and about the spread across the spectrum 
of different actors. 
In discussing domestic realism, whether it be the 
theory itself or the cases that will be addressed later, we 
are primarily concerned with what might be called “normal” 
states, that is, states that have well-functioning political 
systems and well-intended noble motivations but end up 
deviating from the ideal. Our concern is with states and 
actors within those states that hold a high moral standard, 
but seem to experience a “fall from grace” under certain 
conditions. Domestic realism makes a universal claim about 
all countries and backgrounds. But since authoritarian 
regimes are oppressive by definition, the focus is on 
democratic states - states that are least disposed to 
violating citizens’ rights. The cases and the evidence are 
mostly drawn from western democracies to establish the 
departure from the adopted liberal democratic ideal under 
conditions of threat. Furthermore, we are concerned with the 
                     
33 Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), Chapters 1, 9, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf 
(accessed January 25, 2007).  
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behavior of such states whether their actions are carried 
out within their own borders or elsewhere (under a mandate 
in another country or as an occupation force, for example) 
because such states are expected to hold a higher moral 
standard, and because their citizens are brought up and 
schooled in an environment that instills values and ideals 
that respect human rights and individual liberties. Along 
the same lines, states that are exclusive and that 
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion 
are inherently abusive and as such do not warrant 
discussion. 
Domestic realism acknowledges the fact that even with 
violations and departures from ideals, there is a spectrum 
that states and sub-state actors fall on. This spectrum has 
two distinct ends proportional to the severity of the 
responses. The basic notions of domestic realism still hold 
as a matter of principle, but there are different and 
varying shades or degrees. One goal of introducing the  
 
theory is to increase awareness of aberrations and induce 
actors to move along the spectrum from the less favorable 
end to the more favorable one.  
 
E. THREATS AND RESPONSES 
1. Measuring Threats   
It is worth elaborating on threats and their magnitude. 
Threats might mean different things to different people and 
different states; moreover, the perception of a threat might 
change over time. This is the reason we often talk about 
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“perceived threats” which necessitates putting ourselves in 
the other side’s shoes to be able to better assess their 
responses in light of their history, attitudes, culture, 
norms, and beliefs. In many countries the challenge to the 
ruling elites and the prospect of a coup might be the 
primary challenge. The perceived threat in other countries 
might not be as well defined. In the United States, 
challenging the “American way of life” might be seen as a 
threat, as happened under McCarthyism; during the British 
colonial presence in India, the making of salt by Indians 
led by Gandhi was perceived as a threat. 
Threat is not quantifiable; moreover, it is in the eyes 
of the beholder, as was mentioned. The threshold to consider 
something threatening differs among individuals, 
institutions, and states; and it also differs across time 
and after major events such as September 11 or the London 
bombings in 2005. At the individual level, there are of 
course universally acknowledged conditions of high threat to 
life under which laws worldwide grant the right to self- 
defense. On the other hand, however, there are instances of 
violent behavior that seem incongruent and inexplicable for 
the wider public. For example, very few individuals exhibit 
severe “road rage” to basically “snap” and kill a complete 
stranger for no reason other than the latter’s driving 
behavior; most people confine their reaction to the verbal 
level or even just keep on driving without reaching that 
tipping point. Therefore, the analysis of the level of 
threat is context and perception-based and has to be 
assessed in relative situational subjective terms rather 
than in absolute ones.   
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At the state level, the way a state deals with threats 
is bound to be related to the state’s political culture, 
legal system, and accountability. But even in states that 
are well established with a long history of democratic 
tradition and that are least disposed to violate citizens’ 
rights, under certain conditions violations do take place 
even in those higher end countries. It is worth noting that 
in a country like the United States, one that is steeped in 
a constitutionally-mandated democratic tradition that values 
and respects citizens’ rights, the American Civil Liberties 
Union continually champions citizens’ rights, thus 
indicating that the state-citizen relationship is a 
continually evolving interaction that calls for monitoring 
and that context could give rise to aberrations.  
To elaborate further on the concept of the tipping 
point from a state perspective, good insight can be gained 
from the British policy in Northern Ireland. The policy 
during the 1970s “had maintained that ‘terrorism’ could 
never be fully eliminated, and that it was the government’s 
objective to ‘check’ paramilitary activity in order to 
provide for ‘an acceptable level of violence.’”34 Therefore, 
in spite of the fact that this acceptable level is rather 
subjective, the British government felt that it could 
tolerate a certain level of violence on a permanent basis; 
beyond this subjective level, violence would become 
unacceptable.  
Further insight can be gained by looking at a thought 
experiment by philosopher Michael Hooker, even though it was 
                     
34 Peter R. Neumann, “Winning the ‘War on Terror’? Roy Mason’s 
Contribution to Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 14, no. 3, (Autumn 2003): 45-64.  
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initially discussed in a different context. His hypothetical 
experiment involves a glass urn full of marbles to the point 
that everybody agrees that it is full; marbles are then 
taken out one by one to the point that it is almost empty. 
The question he then poses is “[w]hich marble was it that, 
when you took it out, caused the onlookers to shift from a 
state of saying ‘a lot of marbles’ to a state of saying 
‘hardly any marbles’?”. Hooker goes on to say “[o]bviously, 
there was no single marble.”35 In other words there is a 
continuum or a sliding scale for the perception of a 
threshold or a tipping point in each particular situation, 
but nonetheless, once surpassed, the perception changes from 
full to empty or from acceptable to unacceptable. 
 
2. Threats to the Various Actors 
a. Threats to Individuals 
There are many threats to the various actors in a 
state; some are related to the physical safety and security 
of the actors, whereas others might be more cognitive and 
perceptual having more to do with the images the actors hold 
of themselves, their surroundings, and the people they 
interact with. Starting out with the individual and since 
the adopted approach is to extend IR concepts such as 
security, a good starting point is the definition or the 
meaning of security, and the basic needs or interests that 
individuals want satisfied and whose loss might be 
threatening to their well-being as individuals.  
                     
35 Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving 
the Dilemmas of Ethical Living (New York: Quill, 2003), 104. 
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Great insight can be gained into individual needs 
from Maslow’s Theory of Human Motivation in which he spells 
out five categories of needs. We reproduce the list here as 
taken from Davies’ work on Human Nature in Politics where he 
describes the needs as “a system of great use in political 
analysis.”36 The five main categories of needs are: 
 
1. Physical (water, food, sex, etc.); 
2. Safety (order, predictability, dependability of 
the environment); 




More insight into the notion of safety and 
security can be attained from the simple and parsimonious 
dictionary definition of the word security:  
1: the quality or state of being secure: as a: 
freedom from danger : SAFETY  b: freedom from 
fear or anxiety  c: freedom from the prospect of 
being laid off <job ~>...37  
According to domestic realism, individuals 
consider as threatening any event that affects their 
security, that is, endangers their physical safety or causes 
fear and anxiety; that threatens their job performance and 
their economic wellbeing by possibly leading to them being 
laid off from their work; or that affects the order and 
predictability of the environment around them. Equally 
                     
36 A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 
50 (1943): 370-396; as mentioned by James C. Davies, Human Nature in 
Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1963), 8-9.  
37 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., s.v. 
“Security.” 
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important on the threat scale are the less visible threats 
that affect the self-esteem of individuals and their ability 
to carry out their responsibilities successfully; domestic 
realism views the imperative or even the compulsion to 
succeed in fulfilling duties as very essential to the 
individual’s image and self-esteem. Therefore, one could 
reason that, for example, a policeman faced by a criminal or 
faced by a mob in a riot views the situation as threatening 
both physically and emotionally and that according to our 
realist-based model, which will be discussed further in the 
next section, will do all that is needed to assure his 
security especially if the threat level crosses a certain 
threshold according to his or her perception.  
These arguments are supported by research. In 
their book On The Nature of Threat, Milburn and Watman 
elaborate on the psychological effects of being threatened 
and on the characterization of threatening situations.38 The 
authors discuss two aspects: the level of the threat, which 
might be actual or perceived; and the amount of control over 
the situation that the threatened individual experiences.39 
The authors start by explaining that: 
In environments containing threats, organisms 
survive by reducing the randomness around them. 
Danger is implicit in unpredictability; 
consistently successful defenses are usually 
possible only with preparation. Preparation 
requires expectation of threat, and such 
expectations require prediction. Therefore,  
 
 
                     
38 Thomas W. Milburn and Kenneth H. Watman, On the Nature of Threat: 
A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1981). 
39 Ibid., 4-5. 
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organisms that reduce uncertainty have a survival 
advantage over those that do not reduce it as 
effectively.40 
They further state that “the need to control is 
really a part of a more basic drive to reduce uncertainty in 
every way.” They quote A. Adler’s work “that the need to 
control one’s personal environment is ‘an intrinsic 
necessity of life itself,’” and B. Malinowski’s description 
of “primitive belief systems as the result of the desperate 
need of people to assert themselves as masters over a 
dangerous world.” They further discuss G. A. Kelly’s 
hypothesis that “the essence of control was predictability, 
and that the lack of it produces great anxiety.”  G. 
Zimbardo and N. E. Miller went even further and felt that 
“the focus of the drive was on effecting change in the 
environment, rather than on mere predictability.”41 
Therefore, one can conclude that individuals striving for 
control and predictability, maintaining self esteem, 
success, safety, and security are in essence confronting 
threatening situations. 
 
b. Threats to Institutions 
Institutions are subject to threats that are 
similar to those that affect individuals; this is especially 
true for the leadership officials at the helm of a 
governmental institution or organization where the 
performance of the organization reflects directly on their 
                     
40 Thomas W. Milburn and Kenneth H. Watman, 31. 
41 Ibid., 33. 
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status and job security. This is true for organizations in a 
democracy where there is a higher degree of accountability 
for those officials before the public. It is also true in an 
authoritarian regime where accountability is to the higher 
authority rather than the public, which depending on the 
situation might be more or less tolerant of mishaps in 
comparison with a democracy. 
As just mentioned, domestic realism views failure 
as very threatening to organizations; but equally 
threatening to an organization is a loss of relevance. That 
is why officials continually assert the role and relevance 
of their organizations and of the services they provide. 
Failure to accomplish tasks (and at times even a single one) 
could be threatening to higher level officials on the one 
hand and to the very existence of the organization on the 
other hand. Organizational survival is the top priority of 
any organization; it is closely tied with maintaining 
relevance of said organization. In their discussion of 
organizational behavior, Allison and Zelikow state that 
governmental organizations are created in response to 
certain problems and to fulfill certain roles; therefore, 
they strive for efficiency and the “optimal accomplishment 
of the mission.”42 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
provides a recent example of the effect of a lower level of 
performance, or failure of an organization in carrying out 
its expected role, or of living up to expectations as it 
pertains to its performance following Hurricane Katrina 
                     
42 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 149-
150. 
 29
which left a devastating trail in Louisiana and Mississippi. 
The head of FEMA, Michael Brown, resigned soon after; 
moreover, prominent public officials called for abolishing 
FEMA altogether. After meeting in April 2006, the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
recommended abolishing FEMA which was described as a 
“bumbling” bureaucracy. Senator Joe Lieberman, the ranking 
democrat on the committee at the time, cited “neglect of 
duties” and “failures of leadership” Senator Susan Collins, 
the chairwoman at the time, was quoted as saying, “[o]ur 
first and most important recommendation is to abolish FEMA … 
FEMA is discredited, demoralized, and dysfunctional.”43 The 
full Senate later voted to “scrap the name and structure of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and replace it with 
a new independent agency.”44 Therefore, we can conclude that 
success and relevance of an organization are crucial for its 
continued existence and the security of its members. 
Another example that highlights the importance of 
maintaining role and relevance for institutions can be 
gained from the reorganization of the United States military 
following the Second World War, which is codified in the 
National Security Act of 1947. Even though all the entities 
concerned shared the best interest of the country as a 
whole, they also had their own interests and their own fears  
 
 
                     
43 CNN.com, “Senators: ‘Bumbling’ FEMA must go,” April 27, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/27/katrina.fema/index.html (accessed 
January 27, 2007). 
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Agency,” July 11, 2006, 
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for their role and survival within the military; the 
following quote summarizes the interests of the different 
parties:  
The reorganization conflict escalated into “a 
wrenching, bitter struggle.” The prospect of an 
independent air force “engendered fear and dismay 
in the Navy and Marine Corps.” Senior Army Air 
Forces officers questioned the need for navy and 
Marine Corps aviation. The army and Marine Corps 
also had differing views on land warfare 
missions. The army argued that the marines 
“should be restricted to duties with the fleet, 
and have only lightly armed units for shore 
operations.” The navy and Marine Corps opposed 
unification as a way of “protecting their 
functions and the composition of their forces.” 
The Marine Corps saw the struggle as a fight for 
survival.45   
 
c. Threats to States 
States are subjected to more grand scale types of 
threats that either affect a wide constituency or are of a 
high magnitude or visibility. Again these threats might be 
genuine or perceived and they are of course threatening to 
individual leaders, to the ruling elites, or to society at 
large. Examples of threats include war, the prospect of war, 
coups, subversion, terrorism, demonstrations, riots, the 
spread of crime, loss of law and order, the image of an 
ineffectual government, secession, and threats to 
territorial integrity.  
                     
45 James R. Locher, III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-
Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2002), 24-25. 
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The threats cited above are self-evident in the 
challenge they pose for the state; but for the sake of 
example, the threat of secession will be elaborated upon. 
Even though the right of self-determination is universally 
acknowledged, the concern of states for their territorial 
integrity leads them to counter secession attempts by 
minorities.46 Secession is very threatening to the very 
existence of the state in its present format. It leads to 
the breakup of a country, tears people apart, and dilutes 
the resources that are available to the state. A distinction 
needs to be made between the voluntary breakup of a country 
whereby the central authority is indifferent, sympathetic, 
or at least willing to put the issue to a public vote on the 
one hand, and the forcible secession of a part of the 
country against the will of the central government on the 
other hand. Examples of the former include voting for the 
independent status of the Province of Quebec that forms a 
large part of Canada, the Montenegrine referendum, the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, and the splitting of 
Czechoslovakia into two states. Examples of the latter 
include the secession of the South in the United States 
which led to the U.S. Civil War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
and the drive for independence of Chechnya which provoked a 
severe response from Moscow. 
 
                     
46 Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial 
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The U.S. Civil War is often termed the war to save 
the union, and President Abraham Lincoln is one of the most 
respected Presidents credited with preserving the union. 
Lincoln did not accept secession and insisted that the 
“Union of these States is perpetual,” and he vowed to “hold, 
occupy, and possess” the federal government areas.47 The 
President was against backing down in the face of 
secessionist threats, and in an address to Congress talked 
about the war and “domestic foes:” 
And this issue embraces more than the fate of 
these United States. It presents to the whole 
family of man, the question of whether a 
constitutional republic, or a democracy—a 
government of the people by the same people—can 
or cannot, maintain its territorial integrity 
against its own domestic foes.48  
It can be expected that no country would allow 
secession, and it is reasonable to make comparisons with 
major historical events to make the point; this sometimes 
might not be to the liking of those involved in a bitter 
struggle for independence, but it does underscore the fact 
that secession was and is quite threatening to states. The 
following quote from Chechnya Magazine emphasizes this 
point: 
In Moscow in April 1996, President Bill Clinton 
was asked a question on Chechnya and chose to 
make a spectacularly inappropriate comparison to 
Abraham Lincoln in his reply. Clinton said, “I 
would remind you that we once had a civil war in 
our country, in which we lost on a per capita 
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basis far more people than we lost in any of the 
wars of the twentieth century, over the 
proposition that Abraham Lincoln gave his life 
for, that no state had a right to withdrawal from 
our Union.”49 
A very recent example comes from Kosovo. The 
province “has been a U.N. protectorate since 1999, when NATO 
air strikes stopped Serbia’s crackdown on separatist ethnic 
Albanian rebels.” The publication of the plan for the future 
status of Kosovo as a de facto sovereign state by the United 
Nations envoy Martti Ahtisaari provoked a strong reaction by 
Belgrade. “Both Serbia’s pro-Western president, Boris Tadic, 
and its nationalist prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, 
immediately rejected the plan, and reasserted the country’s 
claims to Kosovo as the heart of the ancient Serb homeland.” 
Kostunica further “threatened to cut off diplomatic ties 
with any country that recognizes Kosovo as an independent 
state.”50 
 
3. Perceptions of Threats and Responses 
Faced with threats, people’s perceptions shift and 
become confused. For example, within the context of 
negotiations, the Harvard Negotiation Project members state 
that: 
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people get angry, depressed, fearful, hostile, 
frustrated, and offended. They have egos that are 
easily threatened. They see the world from their 
own personal vantage point, and they frequently 
confuse their perceptions with reality.51 
The perception of threats depends on the relationship 
of the sides and also depends on if the side perceiving the 
threat represents a paranoid target, belongs to a threat- 
oriented culture, or if the individual belongs to the group 
of persons who are “habitually anxious: They tend to have 
low thresholds for assessing present or approaching events 
as dangerous, particularly to their self-esteem. So, they 
fear not only danger, but also helplessness or lack of 
control.” Furthermore, threats affect the way the side 
perceiving the threat views its own image, as they: 
endanger a target’s sense of control. In this 
sense, threats can infantilize a target by 
appearing to reduce his personal potency to that 
of a child. Therefore, threats, as a message 
form, are easily used to demean or insult. It can 
be insulting to be threatened, even when the 
threat’s chances of success are small, because 
the threatener is suggesting implicitly that the 
target is threatenable. 52  
It is worth noting that past experience reduces 
susceptibility to threats. But if the threat persists, the 
individual fights in response under certain circumstances. 
Milburn and Watman list some of these circumstances, they 
include: when fighting eliminates the threat, when it is the 
only way out, when there is loss of status before peers, 
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when it is dishonoring not to fight, when there is a risk to 
lose valuable resources, or when there is the risk of an 
inequitable settlement. The individual does not fight when 
the threat does not affect the above factors, or when it is 
overwhelming.53 
Jervis discusses perceptions of danger. He states that 
“decision-makers often see imaginary dangers,” and that they 
“are sensitive to threats to their security that critical 
observers regard as minuscule.” An important point for our 
discussion and for the reaction of powerful actors within 
the state is what causes them to react to their perceptions. 
Jervis states that people exhibit “perceptual vigilance” and 
a lowered threshold to threats and as such become inclined 
to act by taking “corrective action” to reduce the pain when 
they feel that they have the power to effectively change the 
situation. He further states that “the predisposition to 
perceive a threat varies with the person’s beliefs about his 
ability to take effective counteraction if he perceives the 
danger.” Otherwise, “if there is nothing a person can do to 
avoid the pain that accompanies a stimulus, his perceptual 
threshold for the stimulus will be raised (defense);” that 
is, people exhibit “perceptual defense” and “underestimate 
the chances of harm.”54 
Jervis’ views pertain primarily to individuals; but 
individuals are the decision makers in institutions and 
states and their perceptions eventually shape policies. 
Jervis, nonetheless, does give some examples at the state 
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level that underscore the basic point we are trying to 
emphasize here for the purposes of domestic realism, namely, 
that actors are more likely to perceive threats and to act 
against them when they possess the capability to act and to 
avoid or limit the threat. One of his examples discusses how 
“American perception of the threat posed by Russia at the 
end of World War II may have been facilitated, or even 
permitted, by the belief that this menace would be contained 
by the appropriate policies.” He further states that “actors 
will be slow to recognize dangers when even a policy based 
on accurate perceptions would not be adequate” to counter a 
threat.55 From a domestic realism perspective, institutions 
and states more often than not have the upper hand within a 
given country; thereby there is a greater chance to detect 
threats and to counter them actively.    
 
F. PROJECTING REALISM DOMESTICALLY AND THE ACTORS’ 
RESPONSE TO THREATS 
Having discussed the nature of threats and other needed 
background, we are now ready to “intrapolate” or project the 
tenets of realism that were discussed in a previous section 
to the domestic sphere. Alongside this projection will be a 
discussion of the nature of the actors’ response to threats.  
Building on the concepts of realism, we need to make 
two important points. First, in line with realist principles 
and under conditions of threat and in the pursuit of 
security, modes of behavior of the actors are neither 
affected nor influenced by their culture or their political 
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systems, that is, states and individuals act the same when 
threatened. For example, in spite of their many differences 
culturally and politically, Amnesty International’s 2006 
annual report lumped the United States, China, and Russia 
together, and condemned them for “focusing on narrowly 
defined interests.” The report adds that the “relentless 
pursuit of security by powerful countries has undermined 
human rights.” Talking about the war on terror, Amnesty 
International’s secretary general stated that “[t]here is no 
doubt that it has given a new lease on life to old-fashioned 
repression.”56   
Second, under conditions of threat morality is 
subordinate to safety and security; the fight for survival 
overtakes and subjugates norms and morals. These notions are 
in line with realist thought and they can also be found in 
other works. The German philosopher Nietzsche discussed 
morality and the role of fear in his work titled Beyond Good 
and Evil, stating that “as long as one considers only the 
preservation of the community, and immorality is sought 
exactly and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the 
survival of the community – there can be no morality of 
‘neighbour-love’.” He continues by stating that “fear is 
again the mother of morals,” and that, 
In the last analysis, ‘love of the neighbour’ is 
always something secondary, partly conventional 
and arbitrary-illusory in relation to fear of the 
neighbour. After the structure of society is 
fixed on the whole and seems secure against  
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external dangers, it is this fear of the 
neighbour that again creates new perspectives of 
moral valuation.57  
The discussion that follows will be divided along the 
major variants of realism discussed previously. 
 
1. Projecting Classical and Structural Variants 
Domestically  
For the purposes of this discussion, both the classical 
and structural variants of realism are lumped into one group 
in order to circumvent the old debate of whether behavior is 
caused by human nature or by system-level anarchy. Domestic 
realism adopts the realist principle that actors pursue 
their self-interests and that they seek to increase their 
power but sees the root cause of this pursuit as immaterial 
to this discussion. Writing back in 1951, John Herz 
addressed the issue along this line by reasoning that the 
“accumulation and perpetual competition for more is the 
natural result of the ‘struggle for survival,’” and that 
what propels the competition for more power is not “an 
innate ‘power instinct’” but rather “the mere instinct of 
self-preservation.” He further argued that:  
Whether man is ‘by nature’ peaceful and co-
operative, or aggressive and domineering, is not 
the question. The condition that concerns us here 





                     
57 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, extracts in chapter 
titled “Against Conventional Morality,” in John Cottingham, ed., Western 
Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 402-403. 
 39
social one. It is his uncertainty and anxiety as 
to his neighbors’ intentions that places man in 
this basic dilemma.”58   
Herz in this contest seems to be leaning towards what 
later became known as structural realism or neorealism where 
the structure of the system determines behavior.  
Domestic realism adopts the notions of structural 
realism: the need for and the importance of security, the 
notion that the main goal is survival, and the anarchic 
nature of the system. Domestic realism reasons that, yes 
there is no anarchy domestically in the traditional sense, 
namely that there is of course a central authority that 
people can turn to and that can interfere to limit the 
encroachments of some. But one has to bear in mind that the 
presence of government domestically does not necessarily 
guarantee the security of the actors—especially under 
threat. Individuals still exhibit self-help behavior, they 
still lock their doors and own guns. Institutions could 
actually stand to lose with government regulation; they 
lobby and fight for their status and for their self-
interests. Domestic realism argues that the domestic system 
may still be characterized by what it calls “quasi-anarchy;” 
the domestic setting, in other words, “resembles” the 
anarchy of the international realm especially when there is 
a perception of threat.  
Anarchy is here conceptualized analogous to the “state 
of war” assumed to exist by IR realists, building on Hobbes. 
Of course, there is no continuous war in world politics. But 
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there is the constant possibility and potential of war.59 
Uncertainty, i.e., the aforementioned fear of one’s neighbor 
and of cheating necessitates measures to assure one’s own 
safety in the future. Therefore, by a quasi-anarchic system 
we mean that if the actors within the state are left to 
their own devices they are bound to seek to augment their 
power and clout; and if governments work to limit this 
proclivity, actors within the state will strive to work 
within or around the system to circumvent any restrictions 
and to assure power and survivability. This is evident by 
the ageless wisdom that actors are constantly vying for more 
power within the boundaries of any one country. The attempt 
to counter this propensity by the founding fathers in the 
United States is well articulated in the U.S. Constitution 
through the notion of checks and balances between the three 
branches of government. In spite of these measures, we still 
witness what historian Arthur Schlesinger calls the 
“Imperial Presidency;” a term he introduced in his 1973 book 
carrying the same title.60 In an article titled “The Return 
of the Imperial Presidency?” Wolfensberger states that 
“Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary bluntly defines imperial 
presidency as ‘a U.S. presidency that is characterized by 
greater power than the Constitution allows.’”61 
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The desire to acquire greater power for “political 
survival” and to counter threatening prospects is not 
limited to the executive branch. Seeking more power and 
resources in its rudimentary form, that is money, in a 
manner involving improprieties led to the demise of the 
prominent former Congressman Tom Delay. Yes, the role of 
government and the media is to limit wrongdoing. But the 
tendency to accumulate power is still there, and other cases 
of power accumulation might go undetected beneath the radar 
level or at least remain uncorrectable retrospectively. It 
takes an overly vigilant government as well as political 
opponents to keep track of all possible wrongdoers and to 
prove in a court of law that there were wrongdoings and to 
be able to overturn the consequences. The case of Republican 
Congressman Tom Delay is a case in point. He was considered 
by Democrats a “symbol of abuse of power;”62 and the former 
House Majority Leader was indicted by a Texas grand jury “on 
a charge of criminally conspiring with two political 
associates to inject illegal corporate contributions into 
2002 state elections that helped the Republican Party 
reorder the congressional map in Texas and cement its 
control of the House in Washington.”63 He eventually 
resigned and is facing the court case, but “[n]o jury can 
undo the outcome of Texas’s 2002 elections.”64 
                     
62 David S. Broder, “After Delay, a New Approach?” 
washingtonpost.com, April 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR2006040401273.html (accessed February 
5, 2007). 
63 R. Jeffery Smith, “Delay Indicted in Texas Finance Probe,” 
washingtonpost.com, September 29, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/28/AR2005092800270.html (accessed February 
5, 2007). 
64 Ibid.  
 42
At the state and institutional levels as well, the 
eminence of threats and the effect of system structure lead 
to unexpected outcomes and departures from laws and ideals. 
The United States is the leader of the free world, but 
historically and under certain threats the country deviated 
from its standards and from constitutional provisions. One 
primary example is the actions taken against the 120,000 
Japanese Americans during the Second World War in the wake 
of Pearl Harbor because of national security and for fear of 
divided loyalty or the formation of a “fifth column” in a 
total war setting. This group of people was moved away from 
the west coast of the United States and relocated into 
inland concentration camps, and they were forced to sell 
their property at great losses. “More than two-thirds of 
those detained were Nisei, native-born Americans.” The 
Supreme Court “upheld relocation on grounds of national 
security in wartime.”65 It is worth noting the similarity of 
state behavior in this type of setting; during the Second 
World War, the USSR also sent Germans living on its 
territory to Siberia. They were not allowed to return to 
Germany until after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.66  
Faced by the threat of subversion, the power of the FBI 
grew to resemble what Keller calls in his typology an 
“independent security state,” or a “state within the state.” 
The independent security state defines “security interests … 
[and] neutralize[s] those who disagree;” furthermore, “it 
circumvents legislative and judicial control.” Keller states 
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that FBI policies after 1964, which were “hostile to the 
spirit of liberalism, … persisted only because the FBI had 
developed secrecy and administrative controls to a fine 
point, sufficient to insulate its activities from the 
courts, the Congress, and the public.”67 This insulation and 
the ability to work within and around the system to 
circumvent restrictions and accountability is congruent with 
the previously introduced notion of a quasi-anarchic system 
in domestic realism; it might have been done for a good 
purpose, but it is still extrajudicial. With lower 
accountability and less adherence to the law, Gill states 
that such an institution “constitute[s] the antithesis of 
liberal democracy.” The FBI was involved in “flagrant 
abuses” and relied on techniques such as “mail-opening, 
wiretapping, electronic surveillance, break-ins” without the 
proper authorization.68  
Keller further states that “the state reveals itself 
most clearly when confronted with a threat to its survival;” 
furthermore, “because the highest and most compelling state 
interest is self-preservation, the state also acts against 
the sympathizers and agents of hostile foreign powers;” he 
further goes on to add that: 
In the United States, the threat of subversion, 
espionage, sabotage, extremism, and terrorism has 
functioned historically as the domestic and moral 
equivalent of war. In time of war, niceties of 
civil liberty are suspended…69  
                     
67 William W. Keller, The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall 
of a Domestic Intelligence State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 16-17, 189. 
68 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the 
Liberal Democratic State (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 64, 116-117. 
69 William W. Keller, 190. 
 44
The threat of terrorism nowadays is leading to measures 
that would have been inconceivable before the events of 
September 11, 2001, such as detention, rendition, suspension 
of habeas corpus, eavesdropping, mail-opening, and 
aggressive interrogation. 
It is interesting and noteworthy how the situation, the 
position, or the structure leads to certain policies being 
adopted by people that had previously opposed them when they 
were not within or locked into the decision making 
apparatus. Jervis discusses how “one’s role within the 
government” influences policy choices especially in military 
related issues, which could be interpreted as an issue of 
safety and national security. As an example he mentions how 
in “1910, Winston Churchill, as Home Secretary, led the 
attack upon the demand of McKenna, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, for more ships; by 1913 they had exchanged 
offices and each, with equal conviction, maintained the 
opposite view.”70 A recent interesting example is the Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior which seems to be employing actions 
that would not have been expected from a group that had 
suffered oppression for a long time. Human Rights Watch 
states: “[e]vidence suggests that Iraqi security forces are 
involved in these horrific crimes … abduction, torture and 
murder.”71 It does seem that under the threat of a vicious 
armed resistance, the previously oppressed have turned to 
oppression as they assumed similar administrative roles and 
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as they became responsible for providing safety and 
security. Again, morality takes a second place to security 
under threat; and as Waltz puts it: “Despite cultural and 
other differences, similar structures produce similar 
effects.”72 
 
2. Projecting Offensive Realism Domestically   
Domestic realism also subscribes to the notions of 
offensive realism; namely that powerful players seek to 
dominate the system and prevent the rise of peer competitors 
to ensure their continued survival and hegemony. 
Monopoly is one example from the field of 
microeconomics whereby powerful corporations seek to 
dominate the market and to benefit from what is called 
barriers to entry for newcomers to any one industry. 
Governments do interfere to stop monopolists through 
antitrust laws and the breakup of large corporations such as 
the breakup of Standard Oil and AT&T; in this case the lack 
of anarchy with government presence protects the consumer 
but actually threatens the large corporation seeking to 
achieve “economic hegemony.” The point we are trying to make 
here is that the proclivity is toward achieving monopoly, 
dominating the market, and preventing would be entrants to 
the market.73 As a matter of fact the primary model of 
industry analysis that is taught in Business Schools and 
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texts is the one developed by Michael Porter of Harvard 
Business School and is known as Porter’s Five Forces model. 
The model discusses among other things the threat of 
substitutes to firm products and the threat of new entrants 
because “[u]nless the entry of new firms is barred, the rate 
of profit will fall toward its competitive level.”74  
A very prominent example of the projection of offensive 
realism domestically is the Watergate Scandal. The resulting 
abuse and law breaking behavior is an embodiment of the 
essence of domestic realism that is posited by this thesis. 
It includes all the elements starting with the “lust for 
power,” “the abuse of power,”75 the perception of threat to 
political survival at one stage, the desire to maintain 
dominance at a later stage, the confidence in the ability to 
act, and finally the resulting violations of laws and norms 
and the undermining of the democratic process.  
President “Nixon went to great lengths to guarantee his 
reelection in 1972;” and the “White House labored under a 
siege mentality that seemed to justify any and all measures 
necessary to defeat its opponents.” The threat to political 
survival later disappeared however and the focus seems to 
have shifted to the offensive realism notion of eliminating 
rivals to assure dominance. Historians state that the “irony 
of the Watergate break-in was that by the time it occurred, 
Nixon’s election was assured.” As a matter of fact Nixon’s 
reelection was a “stunning victory.” In line with the 
propositions of domestic realism, numerous violations of the 
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law took place; they included spying, bugging, and break-in 
at Democratic national headquarters in the Watergate 
building; and they were followed by cover-up and obstruction 
of justice.76 
 
G. THE TRAGEDY OF DOMESTIC REALISM 
Along the lines of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons77 in 
which the exploitation of common resources that are 
available to everyone in the society is inevitable, and 
Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics78 in which 
preventing the rise of peer competitors is inescapable, the 
title of this thesis signifies the unfortunate fact that 
domestic realism is likewise unavoidable. There is simply 
too much at stake for the various actors to allow goodwill 
and morality to supersede security, survival, and what might 
seem as the good of the many in confronting the threat of 
the few. Nonetheless, putting this tragedy of domestic 
realism in the proper perspective, and gaining a greater 
understanding of its nature, will help in countering its 
effects, or at least in alleviating its manifestations. 
An important question arises: Why don’t we see wide 
spread violations of the expected standards of conduct? 
Domestic realism answers this question in two parts. First, 
in many cases the unacceptable threat threshold level has 
not been reached to induce a norm-violating response, that 
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is, there might be a higher level of tolerance. Second, that 
violations do actually exist on a larger scale than is seen, 
but are not exposed. Had it not been for the videotaping of 
the beating of Rodney King79, the validity of the claim 
would have been lost between “allegations” and “the ongoing 
investigation.” In a recent CNN program on the first 
anniversary of hurricane Katrina, the killing of two 
residents of New Orleans by officers of the New Orleans 
Police Department is still under investigation one year 
later and the officers are still in the department.80 
Domestic realism calls this the “Visual Tip of the Iceberg;” 
unless violations are documented in picture or in video 
format, they are denied by the perpetrators and, more 
importantly, the aberrations are met by disbelief and denial 
by the general public. The pictures of the abuses at the Abu 
Ghraib prison are another such example. 
It is also important to differentiate between the 
tendency and the wide scale outbreak. By comparison, the 
international system is not marked by numerous wars; and 
realists believe that: 
the best description of world politics is a 
“state of war”—not a single continuous war or 
constant wars but the constant possibility of war 
among all states. Politics is gripped by a state 
of war because the nature of humanity, or the 
character of states, or the structure of 
international order (or all three together) 
allows wars to occur.81  
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H. EXACERBATING FACTORS 
1. Supremacy of Righteousness 
An important corollary takes shape from the primary 
proposition of domestic realism and the prospect of threat 
mentioned above. Since there is a threat coming from another 
side, an unconscious and sometimes deliberate 
differentiation takes place between “us” and “them.” This 
differentiation in time becomes between good and evil, 
between the “good guys” and the “bad guys”, between the 
moral and the immoral. According to Tetlock, leaders could 
even reach the stage of “dehumaniz[ing] out-groups;”82 such 
characterization is encouraged by the fundamental 
attribution error whereby the behavior of others is 
attributed to personal traits rather than to situational and 
external causes.83 This sequence eventually leads to 
feelings of righteousness and moral supremacy, and could in 
various cases lead to unethical behavior that is justified 
on the basis that “we” are working for the common and the 
greater good; unfortunately, there is a transformation at 
times to “the end justifies the means.” Domestic realism 
calls this corollary “Supremacy of Righteousness;” it has 
important ramifications that lead to adopting harsh measures 
and to conducting unethical research. It is in essence 
following Mill’s utilitarianism or consequentialist 
philosophical theory whereby the prime concern is with 
achieving long term results that bring happiness to the 
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largest number of people even if the immediate conduct 
causes pain to the few; the moral value is thus determined 
by the consequences of the act not by the act itself.84 
Therefore, individuals and groups endeavor to do well 
and to reach noble ends. But with the realization that 
somebody out there is threatening them or threatening their 
crusade to do so end up at times reacting in kind. By 
analogy, this is somewhat of a capital punishment for 
committing murder type approach. Trying to refute the 
political idealism of the Wilsonian era, John Herz gives the 
following example along the same line of argument: 
As an illustration let us consider the case of a 
man who is passionately imbued with the urge to 
compassion and the feeling of a compelling duty 
to act accordingly, but who at the same time 
realizes that in order to bring about a “better 
world” (i.e., one in which there is less human 
suffering or misery) force must be applied to 
eliminate the powers of “evil.” Such a man might 
easily become a great religious apostle or a 
revolutionary leader. To him religious wars or 
class struggles would be acceptable, in spite of 
the violence and the suffering of millions which 
they would entail, since the humanitarian end 
would appear to him to justify the means.85 
  
2. Trust Networks 
The one concept that was left out of our projection of 
IR concepts into the domestic sphere is the formation of 
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alliances; according to Walt, “states form alliances to 
balance against threats.”86 Corporate mergers also lead to a 
consolidation of power and resources. For domestic realism, 
a second corollary takes shape with the projection of 
alliance formation under the prospect of threat. Faced with 
threat, individuals react like states that form alliances to 
jointly meet a threat (collective defense) – they tend to 
rely on groups or to form groups of people that they have 
confidence in and that they can trust to provide protection, 
to pool resources, to lend mutual support, and to ensure 
success or at least to prevent failure. In some societies 
these groups might be based on kinship, thus making the 
tribe the basic unit of such groups. In other societies 
lacking such arrangements, groups of people sharing similar 
interests and ideologies come together to form entities such 
as political parties. These arrangements lead to trusted 
political appointments that are sometimes characterized by 
favoritism and cronyism. Domestic realism calls these groups 
“Trust Networks;” they further exacerbate domestic realism, 
diminish oversight, and through homogeneity contribute to 
groupthink.  
Political parties “are the most organized, the most 
powerful, and seemingly inevitable.”87 Nonetheless, “since 
the early days of democracy, many people have viewed them as 
little more than a necessary evil.”88 They are indeed 
necessary, but the presence of groups composed of loyal and 
                     
86 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985):3-43. 
87 Patrick H. O’Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 2nd ed. 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 149. 
88 Ibid.  
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like-minded people could at times shift the focus towards 
parochial interests, as well as reduce critical thinking and 
contribute to groupthink. In the United States, which has a 
long tradition and a well established party system, the 
party label starts to affect behavior toward others. “The 
decline of comity is a product of several converging 
factors, most notably the escalating cohesion within, and 
polarization between, the two parties’ officeholders and 
allied interest groups—a byproduct of partisan 
realignment.”89 Senator John McCain is quoted as saying: 
“The environment here is very poisoned. Both parties are 
playing to their bases and have caused a degree of 
partisanship and enmity that I haven’t seen in the years 
that I have been here.”90 Observers also note that 
“[i]ncivility became so rife in the House;”91 and likewise 
in the Senate, “[c]ivility in this body has eroded over 
time,” commented Senate majority leader in 2004, Bill 
Frist.92 
What we are trying to emphasize is how groups of people 
coalesce and how they view out-groups; furthermore, how such 
in-group forces and uniformity contribute to the famous 
notion suggested by Irving Janis, the Groupthink Syndrome.93 
According to Janis, the symptoms can be divided into three 
types: 
                     
89 Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, 
10th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press), 484. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid., 478. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy 
Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1982). 
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1. Overestimations of the group: illusion of 
invulnerability and excessive optimism; 
“unquestionable belief in the group’s inherent 
morality, inclining the members to ignore the 
ethical or moral consequences of their decisions;” 
2. Closed-mindedness: group rationalization to 
discount warnings; and stereotyping of enemy 
leaders as too evil or too weak and stupid; and 
3. Pressures toward uniformity: self-censorship; 
illusion of unanimity; pressure to conform; 
filtering out adverse information about 
effectiveness and morality.94  
He goes on to say that his analysis can be summarized 
as follows: 
The more amiability and esprit de corps among the 
members of a policy-making in-group, the greater 
is the danger that independent critical thinking 
will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely 
to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions 
directed against out-groups.95 
Tetlock adds to these points that: 
Once people categorize themselves into groups, 
researchers often observe … [that] people 
exaggerate intergroup differences and intragroup 
similarities … [and that] people place more trust 
in fellow members of the in-group … [and that] 
people allocate resources to in-group members in 
ways designed to maximize absolute gain, but they 
allocate resources to out-groups in ways designed 
to maximize the relative advantage of the in-
group vis-à-vis the out-group.96 
  
                     
94 Janis, 174-175. 
95 Ibid., 13. 
96 Philip E. Tetlock, “Social Psychology and World Politics,” in The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 
chap. 35, 895. 
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3. Obedience   
An important exacerbating factor stems from the high 
level of obedience that individuals display towards 
authorities. Individuals might even be sympathetic with 
others that are being subjected to cruel action, but the 
overriding factor is obedience to authority and the shifted 
moral of approval from that authority. The seminal work that 
was conducted by Stanley Milgram on obedience underscores 
this point. In his experiments, individuals were willing to 
administer what they saw as very painful electric shocks to 
another individual who was not performing a learning task 
well enough. The subjects of the experiment were getting 
instructions from the experimenter running the experiment to 
keep going on administering shocks of progressively 
increasing voltage to  the screaming learner who seemed to 
be in much pain; the learner was actually a confederate 
working with the experimenter and he was not getting any 
shocks but merely acting.97 Milgram sums up his conclusions 
as such: 
This is, perhaps, the most fundamental lesson of 
our study: ordinary people, simply doing their 
jobs, and without any particular hostility on 
their part, can become agents in a terrible 
destructive process. Moreover, even when the 
destructive effects of their work become patently 
clear, and they are asked to carry out actions 
incompatible with fundamental standards of 
morality, relatively few people have the 




                     
97 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New 
York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974). 
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of inhibitions against disobeying authority come 
into play and successfully keep the person in his 
place.98  
The structure of society and the nature of upbringing 
children and educating them condition people to obey all the 
way through their early twenties; family, school, and work 
all constitute what Milgram calls “structures of authority” 
emphasizing obedience and often only allowing “discreetly 
expressed dissent.”99  
Milgram’s work on obedience was conducted a relatively 
short time after World War II; one aspect of the research 
was to understand the high level of obedience and the 
limited resistance within the German military. According to 
Milgram, the individual undergoes a moral shift whereby the 
person’s sense of duty or his success in performing duties 
before the authority become dominant: 
Although a person acting under authority performs 
actions that seem to violate standards of 
conscience, it would not be true to say that he 
loses his moral sense. Instead, it acquires a 
radically different focus. He does not respond 
with a moral sentiment to the actins he performs. 
Rather, his moral concern now shifts to a 
consideration of how well he is living up to the 
expectations that the authority has of him. In 
wartime, a soldier does not ask whether it is 
good or bad to bomb a hamlet; he does not 
experience shame or guilt in the destruction of a 
village: rather he feels pride or shame depending 
on how well he has performed the mission assigned 
to him.100 
 
                     
98 Milgram, 6. 
99 Ibid., 135-137. 
100 Ibid., 8. 
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I. CASES  
In the course of our deductive presentation of the 
theory of domestic realism, we alluded briefly to some cases 
that exhibited departure from the expected norms and values 
which are at the heart of the theory. The following chapters 
will rely on the inductive approach and provide more in- 




III. DOMESTIC REALISM AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
There is a limited number of settings in which 
individuals belonging to security or law enforcement 
agencies interact with the public in such a way that misuse 
of official duties or deviation from expected codes of 
conduct take place. These include police brutality, 
interrogation of suspects, the treatment of individuals in 
custody or in captivity, and actions taken against 
demonstrators or rioters. In this chapter two cases will be 
discussed; the first is the Stanford Prison Experiment that 
was conducted in 1971 which represents psychological 
research that is related to guard-prisoner interaction, and 
the second is the unrest at Kent State University in 1970 
that led to the death or injury of several protesting 
students. The point we are trying to emphasize is how threat 
or the perception of threat lead to reactions that were not 
planned nor intended. The cases show how normal average 
individuals put in a certain situation, role, or structure 
could slide into abusive behavior. It is important to point 
out that no implication is made that abusive or violent 
behavior is excusable nor are we apologetic for it, but 
rather that conditions leading to it are abundant unless 
extraordinary measures are taken to limit the effect of 






A. THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT 
Seldom could one devise an experiment to test 
individual interactions. Often such experiments are not 
feasible; moreover, in later years such experiments had to 
go through extensive scrutiny by Institutional Review Boards 
to assure maintaining ethics of research and the well-being 
of the subjects in such experiments. The Stanford Prison 
Experiment was one of those rare settings where such 
research could be conducted. And even though many might 
object to the conduct of such an experiment, it provides 
great insight into human nature and highlights abusive 
behavior by ordinary people with no predisposition to be 
abusive.  
 
1. What Was the Experiment About? 
The Stanford Prison Experiment was about the study of 
prisoner and guard behavior in a mock-up prison that was 
constructed in the basement of the Psychology Department at 
Stanford University. The participants had responded to a 
newspaper ad to take part in a two-week experiment in return 
for a monetary compensation of $15. The applicants were 
screened for psychological problems and as such those who 
were chosen to participate fit the description of being 
average normal college students. Furthermore, they were 
divided into prisoners and guards at random by a coin flip 
without any consideration for their physique or any 
assessment of their traits to assume either role. The 
experiment strove to achieve a high level of realism: 
starting out with the arrest of would be prisoners from 
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their homes by the Palo Alto city police, the search of the 
arrestees, the handcuffing, the reading of their rights, and 
the complete processing and ensuing confusion for the 
prisoners at the police department. At a later stage in the 
prison, it involved stripping of clothes, use of feminine 
dress-like uniforms, attaching a chain to the right ankle, 
use of numbers instead of names, and total control of the 
prisoners’ environment.101  
The guards also had their own khaki uniforms and wore 
sun glasses to hide their feelings. They were asked to 
maintain law and order in the prison, but no details on how 
to accomplish their task were given to them. As the 
experiment proceeded, prisoners protested the dehumanization 
and the bad treatment, and the guards attempted to assert 
their power and authority and to subdue the prisoners using 
several measures to the point of becoming sadistic. When 
confronted with attempts at rebellion or escape, the guards 
added to the initial measures of using uniforms, hooding, 
and push-ups, and sleep control new measures such as sitting 
or stepping on the prisoners’ backs while doing push-ups. 
They also used a fire extinguisher which sprayed very cold 
carbon dioxide against rebelling prisoners, stripped them, 
put the leaders in solitary confinement, controlled their 
meals, controlled their toilet use, and made them clean 
toilet bowls with their bare hands.102 
                     
101 The description of the experiment is available in different 
sources; one such resource is the experiment website by Philip G. 
Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the 
Psychology of Imprisonment,” http://www.prisonexorg/ (accessed February 
16, 2007). 
102 Ibid., the Slide Show, Slides 1-42, starting at 
http://www.prisonexorg/slide-1.htm (accessed February 16, 2007). 
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For the purposes of domestic realism we are more 
concerned with guard behavior and its determinants than with 
prisoner behavior; and primarily with the perplexing 
question of why do “good” people behave in “evil” ways in 
certain settings. According to its primary organizer 
Professor Philip Zimbardo, the experiment sheds light on 
what he calls the “nature of Human Nature,”103 or the “dark 
side of human nature.”104 The important question for the 
researchers after the end of the experiment was “[h]ow could 
intelligent, mentally healthy, ‘ordinary’ men become 
perpetrators of evil so quickly?”105 
 
2. Nature of the Situation  
Professor Philip Zimbardo and his colleagues stress the 
importance of the situation106 in their explanations of the 
behavior during the experiment. But what characterized this 
situation especially for the guards as they embarked on 
their role? How was the situation initially portrayed to 
them? It is noteworthy that:  
                     
103 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation 
Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment,” http://www.prisonexorg/ 
(accessed February 16, 2007). 
104 Philip G. Zimbardo, Christina Maslach, and Craig Haney, 
“Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, 
Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current 
Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2000) 196.  
105 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation 
Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment,” Slide 34 
http://www.prisonexorg/slide-34.htm (accessed February 16, 2007). 
106 Philip G. Zimbardo, Christina Maslach, and Craig Haney, 
“Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, 
Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current 
Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2000) 204-205. 
 61
The guards were given no specific training on how 
to be guards. Instead they were free, within 
limits, to do whatever they thought was necessary 
to maintain law and order in the prison and to 
command the respect of the prisoners … They were 
warned, however, of the potential seriousness of 
their mission and of the possible dangers in the 
situation they were about to enter, as, of 
course, are real guards who voluntarily take such 
a dangerous job.107 
The guards were further told “that if the prisoners 
escaped the study would be terminated.”108 Therefore, for 
our purposes, the guards were given a threatening setting in 
which to work; their success and self-esteem were on the 
line; and their moral concern shifted to trying to fulfill 
the expectations of their higher authority as was discussed 
in the previous chapter on obedience. It is interesting to 
note that the guards internalized their role and became keen 
on mission success and put in extra hours even though there 
was no pay in return for the extra time.109 Furthermore, 
Zimbardo himself, who was playing the role of prison 
Superintendent, became so focused on success and maintaining 
law and order and the security of his prison to the point of 
lashing out at a colleague who was inquiring about the 
experiment’s academic design at the time of a rumored escape 
plot. Upon later reflection, Zimbardo said: 
                     
107 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation 
Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment,” Slide 12 
http://www.prisonexorg/slide-12.htm (accessed February 16, 2007). 
108 Philip G. Zimbardo, Christina Maslach, and Craig Haney, 
“Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, 
Transformations, Consequences,” 200. 
109 Philip G. Zimbardo and others, “The Psychology of Imprisonment: 
Privation, Power, and Pathology,” in Theory and Research in Abnormal 
Psychology, 2nd ed., edited by David L. Rosenhan and Perry London (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), 275. 
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To my surprise, I got really angry at him. Here I 
had a prison break on my hands. The security of 
my men and the stability of my prison was at 
stake, and now, I had to deal with this bleeding-
heart, liberal, academic, effete dingdong who was 
concerned about the independent variable! It 
wasn’t until much later that I realized how far 
into my prison role I was at that point – that I 
was thinking like a prison superintendent rather 
than a research psychologist.110  
The situation was further characterized by its “power-
laden” nature and by the need to control; the guards 
initially used prisoner counts at many times including at 
night to “exercise control over the prisoners.”111 The 
relationship evolved to the point that:  
the need for the now “righteously” powerful 
guards to rule the obviously inferior and 
powerless inmates became sufficient justification 
to support almost any further indignity of man 
against man.112 
In addition the researchers felt that “[e]very guard at 
some time engaged in these abusive, authoritarian behaviors 
since power was the major dimension on which everyone and 
everything was defined in this situation.”113 
It is worth noting that even though this was an 
experiment that did not involve much harm for the guards or 
for their careers as it would have for real guards, their 
                     
110 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation 
Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment,” Slide 27 
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111 Ibid., Slide 12-14.  
112 Philip G. Zimbardo and others, “The Psychology of Imprisonment: 
Privation, Power, and Pathology,” in Theory and Research in Abnormal 
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success and self-esteem pushed them to act harshly against 
the perceived threat that was confronting them. Following 
the prisoners’ rebellion the threat became more defined and 
the division between “us” and “them” became more pronounced 
as  
it was no longer just an experiment, no longer a 
simple simulation. Instead, the guards saw the 
prisoners as troublemakers who were out to get 
them, who might really cause them some harm. In 
response to this threat, the guards began 
stepping up their control, surveillance, and 
aggression.114 
Aggression by the guards escalated daily. “It was 
initially in response to perceived threats,” but was later 
“emitted simply as a ‘natural’ consequence of being in the 
uniform of a ‘guard’ and asserting the power inherent in 
that role.” The use of power “intensified whenever there was 
any perceived threat by the prisoners.” Power became “the 
ultimate reward.” The researchers expected that as the 
prisoners are released “it is likely they will never want to 
feel so powerless again and will take action to establish 
and assert a sense of power.”115   
It is remarkable how roles and situations change people 
behavior as was mentioned in the previous chapter. The 
Stanford team had a former prisoner on the team as 
consultant who later acted as head of the Parole Board in 
the experiment. During the hearings, team members noticed  
                     
114 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation 
Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment,” Slide 20 
http://www.prisonexorg/slide-20.htm (accessed February 16, 2007). 
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an unexpected metamorphosis of our prison 
consultant as he adopted the role of head of the 
Parole Board. He literally became the most hated 
authoritarian official imaginable, so much so 
that when it was over he felt sick at who he had 
become - his own tormentor who had previously 
rejected his annual parole requests for 16 years 
when he was a prisoner.116 
One should not however lose sight of the fact that 
there was indeed individual differentiation. Guards during 
the experiment were divided into three groups: good with the 
prisoners; tough but fair; and hostile and innovative in its 
humiliation techniques. But “[e]ven the ‘good’ guards felt 
helpless to intervene.”117 This again underscores the fact 
that not all people have the same threshold for threats nor 
the same severity of the response once a certain threshold 
is reached; but it also shows the limited ability to 
interfere to correct wrongful situations or excesses in the 
face of overwhelming circumstances. 
 
3. The Experiment and Real Life Situations 
According to the researchers, the most surprising 
outcome is: 
the relative ease with which sadistic behavior 
could be elicited from normal, non-sadistic 
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disturbance which emerged in young men selected 
precisely on the basis of their emotional 
stability.118 
Reflecting on the experiment in a recent publication, 
one of the lessons Zimbardo and his colleagues learned from 
the experiment was that it has “considerable 
generalizability power” along with other psychological 
research, such as Milgram’s work on obedience. Indeed, 
“total situations” can “transform human nature in ways that 
challenge our sense of the stability and consistency of 
individual personality, character, and morality.” They go on 
to add: 
Thus any deed that any human being has ever done, 
however horrible, is possible for any of us to 
do—under the right or wrong situational 
pressures. That knowledge does not excuse evil; 
rather, it democratizes it, shares its blame 
among ordinary participants, rather than 
demonizes it.119  
In real life situations the guards stand to lose more 
if they allow the threats to overtake them. Failure or the 
prospect thereof affects their task accomplishment, mission 
success, ego and self-esteem, image before colleagues, job 
security, and the control of the “bad guys” or the evil and 
inferior others. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, 
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actions are further driven by the need to control the 
situation, increase predictability, and reduce uncertainty. 
William Saletan argues that other factors were left out 
from the controlled experimental setting; he mentions three 
such factors which serve to accentuate perceptions and 
reactions. The first of these factors is personality, namely 
that the participants in the experiment were screened and 
found to be physically and mentally stable in comparison to 
real life individuals who do not go through the same 
process. The second is race, because all the participants, 
except for one Asian-American, were all white Americans, 
which does not carry to many real-life situations. Third, 
supervisors’ input, which is the role institutions play in 
directing individuals or in creating the situation in which 
individuals have to function. He further stresses the fact 
that the situation that people are put in should not be used 
as an excuse to absolve their excesses and wrongdoings—an 
argument that domestic realism embraces.120 
From a domestic realism perspective, the Stanford 
Prison Experiment shows that in the face of threats, 
individuals, who were actually screened for stability and 
who came from a democratic society that values individual 
rights, became quite abusive. The situation affected their 
behavior as they tried to lessen the threat, control their 
environment, increase predictability and decrease 
uncertainty. The fact that this was not a regular job for 
the guards that they risked losing shows that self-esteem 
and success is a major driving factor in meeting threats. 
                     
120 William Saletan, “Situationist Ethics: The Stanford Prison 
Experiment Doesn't Explain Abu Ghraib,” slate.com (May 12, 2004), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2100419 (accessed February 24, 2007). 
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The threat posed by the prisoners, their characterization as 
an out-group, and the fear of failure adversely affected the 
guards’ behavior.   
 
B. UNREST AT KENT STATE: THIRTEEN SECONDS AND THIRTEEN 
STUDENTS 
The events that took place on the campus of Kent State 
University in Ohio during the period of May 1 to May 4, 
1970, were unprecedented. Those events culminated in the 
unfortunate incident of National Guardsmen firing live 
ammunition at protesting students. The shooting that lasted 
for thirteen seconds121 resulted in the injury of thirteen 
students,122 four of them fatally. According to William A. 
Gordon this was a: 
rare incident in American history in which 
American soldiers killed American citizens who 
were trying to petition their government for a 
redress of their grievances. Killings of 
civilians by governments or armies in Beijing, 
South Africa, or in unstable Central American 
countries might not seem that unusual. However, 
in this country, we generally settle our 
differences in a somewhat more civilized 
manner.123  
 
                     
121 The duration of the shootings is well documented in several 
references, one such reference is: Joe Eszterhas and Michael D. Roberts, 
Thirteen Seconds: Confrontation at Kent State (Cornwall, NY: The 
Cornwall Press, 1970).  
122 The number, names, maps, and distances of the injured students is 
also well documented in several references, one such reference is: Peter 
Davies and The Board of Church and Society of The United Methodist 
Church, The Truth about Kent State: A Challenge to the American 
Conscience (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1973), 52-57. 
123 William A. Gordon, The Fourth of May: Killings and Coverups at 
Kent State (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 17-18. 
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1. Causes of Campus Unrest 
The direct cause of student protests at Kent State and 
other institutions of higher learning was the decision a few 
days earlier by President Nixon to send U.S. forces into the 
country of Cambodia during the course of the Vietnam War. In 
denunciation of the decision, there were many student 
protests, and the students at Kent State protested and even 
held a rally to bury the Constitution claiming: “If a nation 
can launch a war on Cambodia without declaring it, the 
Constitution as we knew it is really dead.”124  
Student protests, however, were not new; they had their 
origins further back in history, and in the modern era were 
propelled by events that took place at the University of 
California at Berkeley in 1964. The report of The 
President’s Commission on Campus Unrest called those events 
the “Berkeley Revolt” and the “Berkeley Invention.” This 
revolt, the Commission argues in its report, did not take 
place in a vacuum, was driven by the events of the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, and expanded to other locations because of media 
coverage.125 
The environment in which these protests took place was 
characterized by opposition to the war in Indochina with the 
increased possibilities for young people of being drafted 
into the war effort, and was further driven by the activism 
of the civil rights movement of the 1960’s. The President’s 
Commission Report sums up the motivations by stating: “[i]ts 
                     
124 James A. Michener, Kent State: What Happened and Why (New York: 
Random House, 1971) 13-14. 
125 The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, The Report of The 
President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (New York: Arno Press, 1970) 20-
28. 
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focus was on the unresolved issues of war and peace, on 
civil rights, on the quality of education, and on the plight 
of the poor.” One aspect of the opposition to the war was 
the demand to end defense research and to eliminate the 
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) at university 
campuses including Kent State.126    
 
2. Unfolding of Events and the Official Response 
On Friday May 1st, the two rallies held at Kent State 
were peaceful, including the act of burial of the 
Constitution. Later in the evening, youth gathered in and 
outside Kent bars; some were discussing the extension of the 
war to Cambodia, and some started to throw objects at 
passing police cars. The police could not control the 
situation without enforcements; a bonfire was started 
downtown, and trashing of the downtown area began. The mayor 
declared a state of emergency and contacted the governor’s 
office. The crowd eventually dispersed on its own.127  
On Saturday May 2nd and as a precautionary measure, the 
mayor declared a curfew and stopped sale of alcohol; he 
further asked the governor’s office to send elements of the 
National Guard to Kent. Students gathered in Kent State that 
evening as it was not subject to curfew. The number grew to 
about 1,000, and several instigated to burn the wooden ROTC 
building which was a symbol of the school’s support of the 
war; the building was indeed set to fire at 8:45. The 
students were seen as threatening and destructive. Guard 
                     
126 The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, 21-22, 34. 
127 Ibid., 239-243.  
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troops arrived in town about 9:30 with the flames lighting 
up the area. The troops moved into the campus without 
permission.128 
The campus was initially quiet on Sunday May 3rd 
and school officials worked to maintain calm. The governor, 
however, vowed to “eradicate the problem.” As students 
started to gather in the evening, a curfew was declared and 
tear gas was used by the Guard to disperse the crowd. The 
situation worsened, and no less than three students suffered 
injuries as they were bayoneted.129 
The tragic events of Monday, May 4th, started with 
Guard units being on campus with little sleep, and students 
planning a noon rally to protest among other things the 
presence of the Guard. By 11:45, 500 students had gathered; 
they were asked to disperse and tear gas was used. The 
guardsmen marched down Blanket Hill through the crowd which 
kept reforming around the guardsmen. They later withdrew and 
their commanding officer wrongly thought they had run out of 
tear gas; some students were aggressive and used insulting 
and threatening language and threw rocks at the guards. No 
account is clear on how order broke down, but shots were 
fired for thirteen seconds killing four students and 
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3. Contending Explanations 
The reason that we include this incident under 
individual level analysis is that subsequent investigation 
showed there was no order by the Guard command to fire at 
the students; in other words, it was a reaction by the 
individual troops that was labeled as “instinctive” and 
might have been due to their military training.131 It is 
worth mentioning that none of the guards were convicted in 
the following trial.  
There are of course contending explanations for what 
took place at Kent State, with one side arguing that the 
response was because of threats to the guards, and the other 
side talking about cover-ups and conspiracies. Many argue 
that the distance between the shooters and the injured, 
ranging from 71 to 730 feet, shows that the students did not 
pose a threat to the troops. Furthermore, a summary of a 
Justice Department investigation states that shooting was 
not necessary, the guards were not surrounded nor 
threatened, they only sustained minimal injuries, and they 
still had tear gas.132  
But on the other hand, from the Guard’s perspective, 
“the attitude of the crowd … was menacing and vicious;” 
moreover, the public initially accepted the view that 
actions taken were inevitable on the basis of official 
statements made by a Guard general and later by the 
President, until the media reported details and published 
                     
131 Joe Eszterhas and Michael D. Roberts, Thirteen Seconds: 
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photos of the event.133 Disbelief of aberrations by the 
public unless visual proof is presented is in line with the 
notions of domestic realism presented earlier. At a later 
time, the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest reported 
that it values the work of peace officers, but warned 
against “dangerous and sometimes fatal instances of 
unnecessary harshness and illegal violence by law 
enforcement officers.” The report called for extra training 
“to deal with campus disorders firmly, justly, and humanely” 
and “to avoid both uncontrolled and excessive response.” It 
further calls for the avoidance of sending forces armed for 
war and killing to a disturbance site, for further National 
Guard training in controlling civil disorders, and for 
equipping its units with protection equipment and non-lethal 
weapons.134     
 
4. Putting Ourselves in the Guard’s Shoes  
The argument against the Guard is that the guardsmen 
were not threatened by the distant students to fire their 
rifles; that there was no riot at the time tear gas was 
used; that the Guard violated the students’ constitutional 
rights to assemble peacefully; and that they used deadly 
force following their questionable march down Blanket 
Hill.135  
But on the basis of our previous discussion of threats 
for the purposes of domestic realism, one could also argue 
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that even though the guardsmen might not have been 
‘physically’ threatened, the situation in general was 
‘perceived’ as being quite threatening. The combination of 
large crowds, rock throwing, defiance, refusal to disperse, 
insulting language, as well as the previous trashing of the 
town and arson especially of the ROTC building certainly are 
all factors that do contribute to the notion of a perceived 
threatening setting. According to our previous discussion on 
threats which is based on psychological research, several 
factors contribute to this perception of threat: loss of 
control and lack of predictability, loss of self esteem by 
members of a proud military unit, inability to disperse a 
crowd of teenage students with all the tear gas and rifles 
at their disposal, and the subsequent effect of 
infantilizing the guards and reducing their potency to that 
of children according to the aforementioned reporting by 
Milburn and Watman. This is further amplified by the feeling 
that the students were widely perceived as an out-group that 
is anti-military, as evident by the apparent protest, the 
chanting, and the burning of the ROTC building.  
The shootings are certainly tragic and not excusable, 
but we can trace the psychology leading to it. In a video 
documentary done in 2001, interviews were conducted with 
students and guards 30 years following the events of 1970. 
Students on the one hand felt that they had actually 
surrounded the guards; and guards on the other hand seemed 
to be still struggling in the search for answers; one of 
them, who seemed quite saddened by what happened and about 
to cry, was guessing that it might have been the fear of 
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being overrun and the desire to retreat safely.136 Again 
here, and in line with domestic realism, we see that the 
situation or the structure imposes certain realities that 
give rise to subjective perceptions of threat, reduce trust 
of the other side, and produce what seem to be inexplicable 
norm-violating reflex reactions to the threat. The reactions 
are carried out to assure safety, security, and mission 
success, to maintain self-esteem, to control the 
environment, and to achieve predictability and reduce 
uncertainty.  
There is agreement that the gesture that the guards 
took of kneeling and pointing their guns was not 
appropriate.137 But according to Philip Tetlock, stress 
“impairs complex information processing” and decision making 
“especially in crises, may be more driven by wishful 
thinking, self-justification, and the ebb and flow of human 
emotions.”138 Looking back at the event, one could reason 
that one of the guards reached the tipping point of 
insecurity and snapped. His “first shot may have touched off 
a chain reaction.”139 This is nowadays known in police 
circles as sympathy firing or contagious firing and is 
caused by experiencing what is called associative threat 
assumption. In this mode of behavior the firing by one law 
enforcement officer leads the others to fire because they 
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all feel threatened.140 As he was talking with students at 
the time, one of the Kent professors felt that the guardsmen 
were “scared to death … a bunch of summertime soldiers. 
They’re not professionals. They’re scared kids.”141 
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IV. DOMESTIC REALISM AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL 
  
In the following discussion on the manifestations of 
domestic realism at the institutional level, examples will 
be discussed to show how certain government institutions act 
without a state-wide authorization in order to protect what 
they perceive as the national security of the state. The 
examples to be discussed are those having to do with 
experiments conducted on humans, especially the human 
radiation experiments that were sponsored by the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the predecessor to the Department of 
Energy, and by the Department of Defense.  
It is indeed inconceivable that such experiments were 
ever conducted in the United States with the high value the 
country places on individual rights and liberties, and 
further in light of the recent memory of experiments on 
humans by the Nazis during the Second World War which were 
prosecuted mostly by Americans and led to the Nuremberg 
Code. The Code was supposed to regulate and streamline the 
conduct of experiments involving humans in order to maintain 
ethics of research. But from a domestic realism perspective, 
without being apologetic for the experiments, and without 
trying to excuse the deeds, one has to know where the people 
directing and conducting the experiments were coming from, 
and we need to put ourselves in their shoes. For us looking 
back in retrospect, these experiments do not meet the 
ethical standards applied today, but one has to remember 
that these people had just lived the horrors of the total 
war environment of the Second World War where upwards of 
 78
fifty five million people had lost their lives and tens of 
millions were injured. They had just witnessed the dawn of 
the nuclear age and realized that there is this prospect of 
a nuclear war that threatened the annihilation of cities and 
large masses of people. The need to understand the effects 
of nuclear weapons and the situation that administrators and 
physicians found themselves in justified to them the 
conduction of those experiments. It was again the power of 
the situation they found themselves in, and the adoption of 
the utilitarian approach of benefiting the largest number of 
people which appears to have motivated them.  
What is peculiar about these experiments is that the 
subjects of the experiments were neither the enemy nor 
sympathizing with the enemy. They were neither subversive 
elements nor were they acting against the state. 
Surprisingly, most of them were patients, average citizens, 
and soldiers who were actually the ones to protect the state 
in the face of danger. The experiments provide a clear case 
of domestic realism according to which the external threat 
induces a stark departure of domestic behavior from the 
espoused norms and ethics of a society, which in turn leads 
to grave consequences for citizens of that society. 
 
A. THE NUREMBERG CODE 
After the end of the Second World War, twenty Nazi 
doctors and three other officials were tried at Nuremberg 
for their role in experiments on humans. The trials and the 
adoption of what is known as the Nuremberg Code influenced 
further experiments as after 
 79
Nuremberg those who would conduct human 
experiments in the name of national security, 
including those intending to uphold democratic 
values in the face of tyranny, were forced to 
reckon with the grotesqueries committed by the 
Nazi doctors.142 
Second to the ancient code of ethics known as the 
Hippocratic Oath, the Nuremberg Code evolved to include ten 
points. The primary requirement is the informed consent of 
the subject so that the subject may volunteer after having 
full knowledge of the nature of the experiment and the 
dangers involved.143 
During the Second World War, the Japanese also 
experimented on humans, but the “Japanese exploitation of 
tens of thousands of people in China in horrid biological 
warfare experiments has received precious little attention 
in the West.”144 
 
B. THE SETTING  
The title of Eileen Welsome’s book The Plutonium Files: 
America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War145 
summarizes succinctly part of what was done in the 
experiments. First, the experiments were conducted during 
the Cold War which entailed the possibility and the threat 
of nuclear war. Second, they involved the use of radioactive 
                     
142 Jonathan D. Moreno, Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on 
Humans (New York: Routledge, 2001), 54. 
143 Ibid., 79-80. 
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sources to study their effects on humans. Third, they were 
conducted in secret initially because of national security 
considerations, but later to avoid embarrassment.146 One 
would expect, however, that besides embarrassment there 
would have been a public outcry and a loss of office for 
those responsible. 
It is worth noting how perspectives change with the 
change in circumstances; Jonathan Moreno states that during 
the initial stages of research and as the military was 
dealing with proposals to govern the experiments, 
the medical and military critics in the Pentagon 
were opposed to any written policy that 
threatened to restrict human experiments for 
national security needs, or that questioned the 
moral integrity of physicians and commanding 
officers and their ability to make tough ethical 
calls.147 
At a later stage, however, and during the 
investigations by the so called Advisory Committee in which 
he was a staffer, 
no one was more eager to get the truth out than 
the uniformed officers who were our contacts in 
the Pentagon. They were as outraged as anyone 
else at the thought that soldiers, sailors, or 
airmen might have been abused in government 
experiments – perhaps more, given their sense of 
comradeship with previous generations of armed 
forces personnel.148 
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C. THE REVELATION 
Several people attempted to investigate the experiments 
on humans and to write about them in spite of the secrecy. 
Martha Stephens tried to investigate total body irradiation 
experiments at the Cincinnati General Hospital in Ohio in 
the 1960s.149 But it was not until Eileen Welsome wrote a 
series of articles for The Albuquerque Tribune on the 
experiments that an official investigation was initiated. In 
1994, President Clinton formed a “special commission that 
was to investigate allegations of government-sponsored 
radiation research on unknowing citizens during the cold 
war.”150 The formation of the Advisory Committee on Human 
Radiation Experiments by President Clinton was preceded by 
disclosures from the Department of Energy Secretary Hazel 
O’Leary. She discussed in a press conference aspects of the 
nuclear program and the experiments with the aim of greater 
openness following the end of the Cold War.151  
After receiving the report of the Advisory Committee, 
President Clinton offered an apology, and  
He admitted that thousands of government-
sponsored radiation experiments took place at 
hospitals, universities, and military bases 
throughout the United States during the Cold War. 
“While most of the tests were ethical by any 
standards, some were unethical, not by today’s 
standards, but by the standards of the time in 
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which they were conducted. They failed both the 
test of our national values and the test of 
humanity.”152  
  
D. THE EXPERIMENTS 
Thousands of experiments involving different aspects of 
radioactive substances and nuclear blasts were conducted. 
For example, ninety people sick with cancer were “irradiated 
over their whole bodies as if they were soldiers in nuclear 
war” at the Cincinnati General Hospital in Ohio.153   
To assess the effects of plutonium which at the time 
was feared for being carcinogenic, “eighteen unsuspecting 
patients in hospital wards throughout the country were 
secretly injected with the cancer-causing substance.” The 
amounts used were very small, but no one knew what their 
effect was at the time.154  
In other experiments involving radioactive iron, 829 
pregnant women were given a drink containing the iron that 
was described as being a nutritious cocktail at a prenatal 
clinic at the Vanderbilt University Hospital.155  
Experiments aiming at indoctrination of troops, 
psychological observation, and flash blindness assessment 
were conducted by placing troops close to the site of an 
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above ground nuclear explosion. More than 200,000 troops 
were involved in what became known as the “atomic soldiers,” 
or later “atomic veterans.”156  
Other experiments related to tissue analysis involved 
the collection of “body parts of more than 15,000 humans … 
In countless instances, scientists took the corpses and 
organs of deceased people without getting permission from 
the next of kin.”157  
Various groups of people were subjected to experiments 
involving radioactive tracers; they included impaired 
children at institutions.158 Prisoners were subjected to 
experiments involving chemical agents with the aim of 
hardening the skin against irritants on the battle field.159 
Eileen Welsome, in her analysis of the attitudes of the 
scientists involved, reports: 
Working behind their security fences, the 
scientists developed a them-against-us mentality. 
This attitude was often manifested in a distrust 
of the public and disdain for scientific 
opponents. The “cleared” researchers even began 
to think alike, which accounts in part for the 
remarkably similar statements issued whenever a 
controversy erupted.160 
This again is in line with the notions of domestic 
realism, specifically the supremacy of righteousness and 
work for the greater good, the trusted networks of “us” 
versus “them” and the in-group versus the out-group.  
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There were numerous other experiments related to 
biological warfare effects. “During the period 1949-1969 
more than two hundred open-air tests of U.S. vulnerability 
to biological warfare attacks took place. Sites for these 
tests included Panama City, Florida; Washington National 
Airport, Washington, D.C.; Oahu, Hawaii; Minneapolis, 
Minnesota; and St. Louis, Missouri.” The used substances 
involved what was believed to be “harmless” bacteria and 
zinc cadmium sulfide which was also believed to have no 
health hazards at the time; the public was not informed of 
the tests. The city of San Francisco was also sprayed from 
an offshore boat, and the subway tunnels in New York City 
were also studied for dispersal patterns.161 
In agreement with the tragic nature of domestic realism 
and the inevitability of adverse behavior in the face of 
threats, Jonathan Moreno expects that similar research will 
continue. “Short of a miraculous and fundamental change in 
the human personality, nations and political movements will 
always be interested in novel weapons that might gain them 
at least a temporary strategic advantage over their 
adversaries.” To perfect such weapons and to counter their 
effects human subjects will be needed. He further adds that 
“[n]or will such research only be done by countries or 
leaders we might find of dubious moral standing … Even the 
esteemed Nelson Mandela, when he learned about the South 
African biological weapons development program, is alleged 
not to have ordered its dissolution.”162  
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V. DOMESTIC REALISM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
The actions taken by the French Government in Algeria 
from 1954 to 1962 provide an example of domestic realism at 
the national level. France is the country where the French 
revolution took place; a revolution that provided the 
impetus for many freedom movements worldwide; the country is 
also steeped in a proud democratic tradition. Furthermore, 
during the late 1950s, the memory of the Nazi occupation of 
France was still fresh in the minds of the French. All this, 
however, did not prevent the adoption of harsh measures, 
including torture, when faced with threats in Algeria. Of 
course, one could look at the French presence in Algeria in 
one of two ways. First, as a colonial presence during which 
the actions taken still exhibited a stark departure from 
what would be expected from a democratic country that was 
recently liberated from occupation. Second, the presence in 
Algeria, as was seen by the French themselves, was a 
presence on French territory because they considered Algeria 
an integral part of the country; as such the actions seem 
even worse in the sense that atrocities were committed 
against citizens of the state in what might be considered 
either a civil war or a war of secession. France always 
enjoyed a high standard on issues involving human rights, 
but as a clear case of domestic realism in the face of 
threats, the moral guard was down and morality certainly 
took a second place to security and territorial integrity. 
Unfortunately, the measures employed were quite severe and  
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unexpected, thereby “tarnishing and weakening France’s claim 
to epitomize ‘Western civilization’ and carry the banner of 
the ‘Rights of Man’.”163 
 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
France conquered and colonized Algeria which was under 
Ottoman rule in 1830. France further made it a French 
territory when the Constitution of the Second Republic 
declared it an integral part of France in 1848.164 Algeria 
remained under French rule until it was granted independence 
in 1962 after mounting international pressure and following 
a vicious war that lasted for eight years. “The Algerian War 
(1954-1962) – which until 1999 was denied by France as a war 
or just known as the ‘War with no Name’ – in fact saw 
fighting on a massive scale.”165  
Expectedly, Algeria was never integrated into France. 
After all, the Algerians were of a different culture, 
religion, and ethnicity. Martha Crenshaw states that “France 
was a democracy, but the majority of Algerians were excluded 
from its benefits despite the legal fiction of 
‘integration.’”166 Following decades of French rule, the 
Algerians called for their liberty; a cause that was 
championed by different groups including the National 
Liberation Front (FLN); but France would not give up Algeria 
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that easily. Furthermore, as domestic realism argues, this 
out-group status of Algerians contributed to the adoption of 
the harsh measures used against them. 
 
B. ATTACHMENT TO ALGERIA  
Over their long presence in Algeria which spanned more 
than 130 years, the French developed a strong attachment to 
the country, and the number of French as well as other 
Europeans in Algeria increased steadily over time. According 
to George Kelly, “this population was simply under no 
circumstances prepared to leave; it had literally nowhere to 
go, no other place where it could feel at home.”167 He 
further states that the French developed a fascination with 
Algeria and the beauty of the land:  
Above all, they discovered a curious wonderland 
of its own dimensions that seemed strangely 
suited to be called “France.” This “Algerian 
intoxication” struck people on the Left and 
people on the Right, and was far from being an 
artificial excuse.168 
The discovery of oil in Algeria in 1956 and the 
shipping of its first supply to France in 1958169 might have 
added an economic motive to the attachment. 
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C. THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
In light of what might be considered the inferior 
status of the vast majority of the Algerian population under 
a basically colonial rule, a revolution leading to an all-
out war was bound to take place. George Kelly sums up the 
perspectives of the warring parties: “[f]or the 
nationalists, the Algerian War was, officially, a ‘war of 
reconquest’ against the colonialists … For the French Army, 
reeling from Indochina, it was the war that, even against 
the will of God or man, could not be lost.”170  
Of course, the French Army in Algeria represented the 
French government and was observing the state policy of 
keeping Algeria French. Speaking to parliament following the 
start of the insurrection in November 1954, the prime 
minister at the time, Mendes France, said:  
Let no one expect of us any circumspection with 
respect to the sedition or any compromise with 
it. We don’t compromise when it comes to 
defending internal peace of the nation and the 
republic’s integrity. The departments of Algeria 
are part of the Republic, they have been French a 
long time. Between it [the Algerian population] 
and the mainland, no secession is conceivable … 
Never will France, never will any parliament nor 
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The minister of the interior at the time and later 
president of France, Francois Mitterrand, “was equally 
adamant. ‘Algeria,’ he said, announcing the theme to be 
sounded endlessly in parliament and press, ‘is France.’”172 
 
D. FALL FROM GRACE 
The war was costly to both sides; but with a clear 
disparity in military power and resources, one can expect 
the Algerian nationalists to have suffered the most. The 
French army had the training, the tanks, the air force, and 
a military presence totaling 500,000. Algeria is known 
regionally as “the land of the million martyrs;” indeed, the 
Encyclopedia Americana states that “[l]iberation had come at 
a high price: estimates range from 300,000 to 1 million dead 
as a result of the war.”173  
But it was not the casualties that brought infamy to 
the “War Without a Name.” It was the pervasive, 
“organized,”174 and “institutionalized”175 use of torture by 
the French authorities. Reservists gave lengthy accounts of  
the army’s uses of the sun, of beatings, of water 
and deprivation of water, of splinters pushed 
under the nails of fingers and toes, of lighted 
cigarettes pressed to the flesh, of bottles 
rammed into vaginas, of bodies twisted and 
contorted by means of pulleys and ropes. But the 
appliance that evidently impressed the reservists 
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most, perhaps because of its ubiquity, was the 
hand-cranked field generator, or “magneto.” 
Torture by means of electric shock was simple and 
efficient.176  
John Talbott quotes American writer Paul Zweig as 
saying that a “moral numbness” developed towards death, 
torture, and humiliation. He further quotes the French 
writer Simone de Beauvoir as saying: “[o]ne gets used to it. 
But in 1957, the burns in the face, on the sexual organs, 
the nails torn out, the impalements, the shrieks, the 
convulsion, outraged me.”177 
Other measures besides torture and the large scale 
killing of people included: summary execution, reprisals, 
“accidents of war,”178 and the disappearance of thousands of 
prisoners.179 Moreover, there was the indiscriminate killing 
of thousands of villagers and the wiping out of whole 
villages.180 In addition, there was the “socially and 
economically devastating relocations of millions of 
Algerians to resettlement camps.”181 There does not seem to 
be any indication that these actions were state-ordered, but 
from a domestic realism perspective it is analyzed under the 
state level because, as in any colonial setting, the French 
Army represented the French government, and was carrying out 
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as its instrument the state policy of keeping Algeria 
French. Thus, even though the government (under Mollet) 
established a committee of inquiry into torture charges, the 
“government showed that it was not eager to have the 
committee find out anything.”182 
It is worth noting that the threats posed by the war in 
Algeria affected not only Algerians, but native French 
intellectuals and the behavior in mainland France too, in 
accordance with domestic realism. The disappearance of 
antiwar activist Professor Maurice Audin while in the 
custody of the paratroopers led to what became known as the 
Audin Affair. The later revelation that he and another 
European by the name of Henri Alleg “had been tortured at 
the hands of the French army shook the conscience of 
France.”183 The war also led to government restrictions on 
the freedom of the press and to censorship.184 As was 
mentioned, violence spread to the mainland. One such example 
is the “[m]assacre in Paris by French police and security 
services of 200 peaceful anti-OAS Algerian protestors;” the 
OAS was “the secretive and violently extremist” group 
supporting a French Algeria.185  
The narrative given above affirms the claims of 
domestic realism; namely, that the democratic system of a 
country, its culture, and the values that the country 
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espouses do not moderate its reaction to threats. In the 
particular case of France, the recent bitter occupation of 
its land also did not serve to offset the harsh measures 
employed in quelling the Algerian uprising in a land that 
France itself was occupying at the time. The policies in 
Algeria did upset the French conscience and evoke cognitive 
dissonance between the ideals held and the acts perpetrated. 
Nonetheless, it took eight years of war, the pressure of 
world opinion that recognized Algeria’s right to be 
independent in the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1960,186 and the strong presence of General Charles 
de Gaulle who spoke early in 1960 of an Algerian Algeria.187 
He “abandoned the policy of keeping Algeria French, entered 
into negotiations with the Algerian revolutionaries, and 
relieved France of a ruinous obsession.”188 It is worth 
mentioning that there was a failed putsch attempt headed by 
four French generals in Algeria to overturn the 
democratically-elected president, General de Gaulle and his 
policies; there were also subsequent assassination 
attempts.189 
Along the lines of domestic realism that there is bound 
to be a deviation in behavior under threat even in a liberal 
democratic state, George Kelly states, but unfortunately 
with an apologetic tone, that: 
 
                     
186 Alexander and Keiger, xv. 
187 Ibid.  
188 John Talbott, The War Without a Name, xiii.  
189 Alexander and Keiger, xvi, xviii. 
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The shallowest argument was the one, sometimes 
proclaimed by Western “liberals,” which held that 
the “higher” European civilization was above such 
baseness and obliged to give battle under 
gentlemanly rules.190   
Affirming the deviation in behavior under threat that 
is predicted by domestic realism regardless of culture and 
the state’s political system, John Talbott refers to the 
first essay on the war by Pierre-Henri Simon in which he  
took the position that in Algeria France had 
fallen away from the behavior every citizen of a 
liberal-democratic state had a right to expect 
and demand as a condition of his own membership 
in it. France was historically the champion of 
human rights, the liberator of oppressed peoples, 
the civilizer of less advanced societies. The use 
of torture in Algeria betrayed this tradition and 




                     
190 George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers, 204-205. 
191 John Talbott, The War Without a Name, 102. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
   
A. THE TRAGEDY OF DOMESTIC REALISM 
The theory of domestic realism was introduced using a 
dual track approach. The first is eclectic and deductive; 
this track adapted concepts from diverse fields, especially 
from International Relations theory, to build a theory of 
state behavior at the domestic level under the perception of 
threat. The second track was inductive and made use of cases 
and observations to enforce the theory’s generalization. 
International Relations theory, and realism in particular, 
provided two major concepts: the similar behavior of actors 
across cultures and political systems under threat, and the 
primacy of security and self-preservation over morality when 
faced with threatening situations. 
The theory of domestic realism highlights the adverse 
domestic behavior of states and sub-state actors, namely 
institutions and individuals, under a perceived high level 
of internal or external threat. Utilizing the concepts 
adapted from realism, the theory assumes that all peoples 
under severe threats act in a similar manner and that the 
primary concern for security and self-preservation 
supersedes any ethical considerations and legal implications 
that restrain and condition behavior under normal 
circumstances. The previous theory-building chapters and the 
following case studies show that the actors deviate from 
their espoused norms, laws, and values in ways that seem 
inconceivable even to them considering their status and 
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their role in championing and promoting individual liberties 
and human and civil rights. In spite of its tragic and 
unsettling nature, it behooves us to accept the basic 
proposition of domestic realism that aberrations in behavior 
are inevitable in the face of looming threats. Only through 
increased awareness can we educate leaders at different 
levels to account for the manifestations of domestic realism 
as they formulate policies, and prompt them to be proactive 
and to incorporate mechanisms for oversight, accountability, 
and the enforcement of a code of conduct.  
Usually we, as individuals or as groups, take pride in 
our history, our culture, our role, and our moral standing, 
thereby overlooking the fact that some of us while acting on 
our behalf to protect our well-being feel compelled to 
sacrifice some of our mores. In the course of their work for 
what they perceive as the greater good of the society 
against the threat of what they see as evil, they jeopardize 
the very basics of what defines us and what makes us good, 
caring, compassionate, and human. 
The adoption of this utilitarian perspective by the 
actors seems to justify to them any and all measures to 
counter the impending threats. Moreover, threats diminish 
the actors’ self-esteem and their control over the 
situation, decrease predictability and increase uncertainty, 
thereby eliciting a harsh response. There is usually too 
much at stake for the actors to allow threats to overwhelm 
them: loss of image, reputation, prestige, job security, and 




as the expectations of the society, feelings of 
righteousness, distrust of out-groups, and the morality of 
obeying a higher authority.   
It is important to stress that domestic realism strives 
to provide a better understanding of the world around us and 
to provide insight into events and factors that shape them. 
There is a perennial need to shed light on negative actions 
and shortcomings, which we all wish did not exist, in order 
to inoculate people at all levels and to empower them with 
the knowledge to counter, or at least mitigate, the tragic 
repercussions predicted by domestic realism. In spite of the 
inevitable impact of the threat on the response, the 
severity of that response by the different actors still 
falls across a spectrum, and we stand to gain by helping the 
actors move from the less favorable end to the more 
favorable one. Furthermore, by increasing awareness of 
domestic realism and increasing the understanding of threats 
and their perception, determinism is in essence reduced and 
more choice is provided to the actors. The change is 
primarily due to the changed perception of the situation, 
the shifted threshold level, and the increased tolerance. 
The notion of choice, even with a narrowed range of choices, 
is important as domestic realism holds that the actors are 
still accountable for their actions and that situational 
pressure does not absolve wrongdoings. 
 
B. WHO SHOULD CARE? 
Everybody. Whether in government, the military, law 
enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, or private 
citizens, everybody needs to develop an awareness of how 
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things in the past have gone awry in certain settings and 
how they could very well do so in the future. Only with 
awareness and understanding could we hope to steadfastly 
adhere to our moral compass. 
 
C. THE VANGUARDS 
Even though the introduction of domestic realism 
presented examples that were critical of how democracies 
acted in some historical settings, it is still at its heart 
an argument for democracy, for more democracy, and for a 
system of more abundant democracy as the best means of 
governance. Nonetheless, domestic realism, contrary to 
conventional wisdom and to writings that extol the virtues 
of democracy without qualification and frame it as the 
ultimate panacea, argues that democracy under threat is not 
immaculate and that the behavior of democratic states and 
their citizens is replete with transgressions on individual 
liberties, human rights, and on democracy itself and its 
spirit. In other words, democracy is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition as people move from the abstractions of 
theory to practical implementation. The best way to inch 
democracy towards perfection is by studying and pointing out 
the settings in which fear trumps democracy; settings in 
which the mechanisms of democracy seem to fail us 
altogether. The insight gained from domestic realism 
regarding responses to threats, in spite of the inevitable 
nature of the response, helps to mitigate the effects and 
prompts policy makers to account for it in formulating 
policies and reactions. 
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D. MAINTAINING OUR HUMANITY 
In spite of the provocative claims of the theory of 
domestic realism and what might seem like a pessimistic 
outlook regarding behavior under threat, domestic realism 
still offers some hope by advocating equality, transparency, 
accountability, and tolerance.  
The basic simple rule that should be kept in mind is 
the equality of people on the basis of their humanity alone. 
Respect for people and their rights should be based upon 
their mere belonging to humanity and should transcend 
subdivisions such as class, nationality, ethnicity, 
religion, or political affiliation. Prophets, philosophers, 
and religions preached equality. All of us should strive 
towards the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s notion of the 
“categorical imperative” which states: “act only on that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.”192 
 
                     
192 Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices: 
Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living (New York: Quill, 2003), 24. 
The categorical imperative is restated in the form of a practical 
imperative as: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end;” this is found in Immanuel 
Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, extracts in John 
Cottingham, ed., Western Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 381-387. 
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